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CHAPI'ER I 
THE INCIDENT 
On February 15. 1779. Gerard. the French minister to the United 
States officially notified the Continental Congress that it was the 
"desire of His Most Christian Majesty that the United States would 
speedily put themselves in a condition to take that part in the nego-
tiation for peace which their dignity and interest required." He added 
that they should "lay a solid foundation for obtaining a speedy peace" 
by "giving their plenipotentiary the most ample instructions and full 
powers."1 
Although Congress took prompt action on the French suggestion 
and received a committee report "as to conditions of pacification and 
particularly as to the Mississippi and Fisheries"2 on February 23. it 
was not until August 14 that "the Instructions for a. treaty of peace 
with Great Brita.in"3 were finally agreed upon. The debate in Congress 
had been long and difficult; it had been fiercely sectional and had 
indicated that future American-French relations were not to be smooth. 
First, there was the .;,assissippi question. Throughout 1778, 
the United States and Spain had been angling for control of the 
L ~barton. Francis, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States, The Government Printing Office, Washington. 1889; III, 
49-50. 
2Ibid., III, 58. 
3Ibid., III, 300. 
Mississippi. Since France desired an alliance with both Spain and the 
United States, at first she took no part in their dispute. But by 
October of 1778, Gerard, the French minister, departed from the position 
of disinterested criticism of the two countries' claims and bec~~e the 
avowed champion of the cause of Spain. This is somewhat understandable 
because, as Edward Corwin has pointed out, a Frenchman was prone to 
regard England's claim to the Mississippi--and hence the claim of the 
United States--as founded upon conquest alone.4 Gerard knew that 
Vergennes desired Spain's assistance in the prosecution of the war 
against England, and he had little understanding of, and no sympathy 
with, the .American claims as they were represented in Congress. So it 
was that on January 28, 1779, Gerard reported to Vergennes that he had 
infor~med the Americans that the French government no longer accepted 
the American pretensions in the West.5 
Disagreement about the :Mississippi was but one phase of the 
peace problem. Whether the United States should propose participation 
in the Newfoundland fisheries as a sine sua~ of the peace with Great 
2 
Britain was the other moot question, and its determination caused heated 
debates for four months. Gerard found himself drawn into this dispute 
also, and he entered with a great show of passion. On May 14, 1779, he 
....o===--....--"') 
4Corwin, Edward S., French Policy ~ the A.rnerican Alliance, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, Conn., 1916, 246. 
5Circourt, Histoire de l'Alliance, III. 264-6. Quoted by Corwin, Ibid., 
253. 
reports to Vergennes: 
I told them that I was convinced that 
England would grant them the fisheries 
by the same title as that by which they 
had previously held them, to wit, as 
subjects of the British crown, but that 
they had no need of the aid of France 
for that arrangement.6 
F'aced with the threat of civil war or secession if New England was 
opposed in her fisheries, Gerard bluntly informed Congress that "if the 
Americans had the audacity to reduce His Majesty to the necessi'bJ of 
choosing between the two lSpain and the United States), his decision 
would not be in favor of the United States ••• (and) that certainly the 
king would not consent to consume the rest of his realm through a 
succession of years in order to procure a small increase of fortune for 
a few Uew England shipowners."7 
Confronted with such vigorous representations the New England 
delegates agreed not to insist upon the fisheries as a ~ qua ~ of 
the peace, but they were careful to have John Adams of f~ssachusetts 
appointed as peace commissioner. Despite a rhetorical condemnation of 
3 
the fisheries which he had made in the past,8 Ad~ms was to prove himself 
a dependable protagonist for the interests of New England.9 
The appointment of John Adams could have been justified by many 
6Doniol, Henri, Histoire de la Participation de la France a l'ltablisse-
ment des Etats-Unis d'Amlrique, CorresvondenoeDiplomatique et Documents, 
Imprl.inei=ie Uationale, Paris, 1892, IV, 138. 
7Ibid., III, 177-81. 
8Ada~s, John, Works, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Little Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1856, VII, 47. 
9Ibid. III 263. \-
arguments. He had returned from a diplomatic mission in France but two 
months before. From this mission, as Carl Van Doren expresses it, he 
had "honestly recom1nended himself out of office. nlO At this time, 
Adams carried with him a letter of commendation from the French foreign 
minister, Vergennes: 
Although you are to be henceforth without a 
public character in France, be persuaded that 
the esteem and consideration which you have 
justly acquired are by no means diminished, 
and I flatter myself, sir, that you will not 
deprive me of the pleasure of assuring you of 
it by word of mouth, and being at the s~~e time 
the interpreter of the favorable sentiments 
with which the king honors you. They are the 
consequences of the particular satisfaction 
which his majesty has received from the wise 
conduct you have held during the whole tLme of 
your commission.ll 
Ada~s's patriotism, honesty and courage were absolutely 
4 
beyond question. Despite his egoism, as Bernard F~~ says, "it would have 
been hard to find a more educated or perspicacious man.nl2 Although he 
lacked solid diplomatic training, there was no other possible choice who 
had been better trained. Indeed, so wise did the choice appear that 
immediately following his selection, Adams received flattering letters 
from Gerr.y and Lovell and a most gracious note from La Luzerne.l3 
lOvan Doren, Carl, Benjamin Franklin, Garden City Publishing Co., Inc. 
New York City, 1938, 608. 
llWharton, ~· cit., III, 55. 
12Fii.Y., Bernard,""Fra.nklin, ~Apostle of Modern Times, Little Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1929, 441. 
13Wharton, op. cit., III, 352. 
5 
On November 13, 1779, Adams sailed from Boston on the French 
frigate, Sensible, with his two sons, John Quincy and Charles. He had a 
most unpleasant journey, and when the leaky Sensible put into the port 
of Ferrel, Adams decided to make the rest of his way overland. His 
diary contains the rueful account of the hard journey through Spain, 
where, to the disgruntled Yankee, "nothing appears rich but the churches; 
nothing fat but the clergy."l4 
Adams had hardly arrived in the French capital before he sent 
Vergennes the startling communication that he considered it his duty to 
inform the British government that he was in Europe to conclude treaties 
of peace and trade. In the year which had elapsed since the French had 
suggested that America send a plenipotentiary for peace with England, 
the fortunes of the war had changed. Vergennes feared that Adams's 
announcement would indicate to the British that America was no longer so 
desirous of continuing the war and that it would induce the British to 
make new overtures to win over the peace bloc in the Continental Congress. 
Anticipating the objection that the time was not ripe for the 
announcement of the purpose of his mission, Adams had prefaced his 
request by saying: 
From conversation with gentlemen at Boston, 
who were members of Congress, and from private 
letters, I learned in general that it (the 
decision to send a commissioner for peace) was 
not of a~ sudden deliberation or the fruit of 
any particular event of the war, prosperous or 
14Adams, Works, III, 244. 
adverse, but a measure that had been more than 
a year under consideration.l5 
Then he had continued by urging the following questions which were so 
unwelcome to Vergennes and which more than anything else produced the 
awkward situation that followed. 
(1) Whether in the present state of things, 
it is prudent in me to acquaint the British 
ministr,y that I am arrived here, and that I 
shall be ready to treat whenever the belli-
~erent powers shall be inclined to treat. 
(2) Whether it is prudent in me to publish 
in any manner more than the journals of 
Congress may have already done the nature 
of my mission. 
(3) Or whether to remain on the reserve, as 
I have hitherto done since my arrival in 
Europe.l6 
6 
In answering these questions Vergennes fell back upon an intro-
ductor,y remark of Adams, in which Adams had admitted: "As I was not at 
Congress when this transaction Cthe choosing of the plenipotentiar,y) 
took place, I am not able to inform your excellency ve~ particularly of 
the rise and progress of it."l7 Vergennes said, "I think, before I reply 
to different points on ~ich you consulted me, that it is proper to wait 
for the arrival of M. Gerard, because he is probably the bearer of your 
instructions, and will certainly be able to make me better acquainted with 
the nature and extent of your commission."l8 In general, however, he 
counseled conceaLment. 
15Wharton, op. cit., III, 492. 
16Ibid., III; 492-3. 
l1Ibfd., III, 492. 
l8Ibid., III, 496. 
To Adams, concealment was distasteful, and the French refusal 
to accept his statement of the nature of his mission, together with the 
belief that Gerard would have more detailed and more accurate infor-
mation about it, seemed to be an insult to a sovereign nation. Two 
excerpts from the eight items of comment which Adams added to his diar,y 
in regard to this incident show how deeply he felt about the matter: 
The instructions of a sovereign to his 
ambassador are a secret and confi-
dential communication between them; a 
sacred deposit, committed by the master 
to the servant, which the latter is 
under the strongest ties of honor, 
fidelity, and conscience, to preserve 
inviolate, until he has an express 
permission or injunction to reveal it. 
The Count had probably instructed M. 
Gerard by some means or other, to penetrate 
into the secrets of Congress, and obtain 
from some of the members, or some of the 
secretaries or clerks, copies of the most 
confidential communications between 
Cdngress and their ministers.l9 
During the next fewmonths Adams repeatedly urged the publi-
7 
cation of the nature of his mission. Each request was to Vergennes like 
a blow from a light lash. He told Adams that he would announce in the 
Gazette of France that Adams had arrived "to assist at the conferences 
for a peace when that event shall take place,"20 but later told him that 
19Adams, Works, III, 261-2. 
20Wharton, op. ~·· III, 580. 
8 
he had not known that such announcements were never made in this publi-
cation. He then assured him that it would be quickly published in the 
Mercure de It,rance. 
On June 16~ 1780 their relations were subject to a series of 
events which made them more and more strained. On this day, Adams sent 
to Vergennes a Boston newspaper, which he had received from a friend. 
In it there was an account of a Congressional bill "establishing an 
annual tax for seven years, for the redemption of their part of the bills 
payable in silver and gold at the market price in hard money. n21 Adams 
contented himself ~th the above words of explanation. Since the bill 
provided that 97 cents out of a dollar would be defaulted, Vergennes 
viewed the bill quite differently. His criticism of it was quite justi-
fiably severe, but at times it became offensive. He wrote Adams: 
It appears that the assembly of Massachusetts 
has determined to adopt the resolutions of 
Congress fixing the value of the paper money 
at forty for one of specie •••• While I admit, 
sir, that the assembly might have recourse to 
the expedient above mentioned in order to remove 
their load of debt, I am far from agreeing that 
it is just or agreeable to the ordina~ course 
of things to extend the effect to strangers as 
well as citizens of the United States.... I 
will only add that the French, if they are 
obliged to submit to the reduction of Congress, 
will find themselves victims of their zeal, and 
I may say of the rashness with which they exposed 
themselves in furnishing the Americans with arms, 
ammunition, and clothing; and, in a word, with 
all things of the first necessity of which the 
Americans stood in need. You will agree with me, 
sir, that this is not what the subjects of the 
king ought to expect; and that, after escaptng 
the dangers of the sea, the vigilance of 
the English, instead of dreading to see 
them plundered in America they ought, on 
the contrary, to expect the thanks of 
Congress and of all the Americans, and 
believe that their property will be as 
secure and sacred in America as in France 
itself.22 
Vergennes added that La Luzerne had orders to make the 
strongest representations to Congress against the bill. Adams wrote 
immediately to Franklin and urged him to attempt to have Vergennes's 
orders stopped. He then appealed to Vergennes to withhold his orders 
9 
until he, Adams, could write a defense of the Congressional action. That 
ve~J night he sent off to Vergennes a long dissertation justifying the 
American monetary policy. 
His principal arguments were: 11No foreign merchant ought to 
expect to be treated in America better than her native merchants." He 
reminded Vergennes that France was suffering no monetary loss in 
supporting America in the war: 
The flourishing state of her (France's) 
marine and commerce, and the decisive 
influence of her councils and negotiations 
in Europe, which all the world will allow 
to be owing in a great measure to the 
separation of America from her inveterate 
enemy and to her new connections with the 
United States, show that the obligations 
are mutual. 
And finally, he takes up Vergennes own words when he says: 
I can not excuse myself from adding that 
most of the arms, ammunition, and clothing 
22Ibid., III, 806-7. 
for the army have been contracted for here 
by the ministers of Congress~ and paid for~ 
or agreed to be paid for~ here in silver and 
gold. Ve~J little of these articles have 
been shipped by private adventurers. They 
have much more commonly shipped articles of 
luxury of which the country did not stand in 
need, and upon which they must have made vast 
profits.23 
Meanwhile~ F'ranklin had sent Vergennes 11a request in conse-
quence of an application" made to him by Adams that the orders should 
10 
be suspended~ "as that plenipotentiary is able to prove that those 
orders are founded on false reports."24 Vergennes in answering Franklin 
referred to Adams's last letter quite disparagingly: 
Mr. Adams. on the 22d, sent me a long disser-
tation on the subject in question, but it 
contains only abstract reasonings,hypotheses, 
and calculations whiCh have no real foundation, 
or which at least do not apply to the subjects 
of the king, and in fine principles. than which 
nothing can be less analogous to the alliance 
subsisting between his majesty and the United 
States.25 
The "pretended proofs"26 of Adams did nothing to change 
Vergennes's opinions. Indeed Vergennes wrote to Franklin that "the 
king is so firmly persuaded. sir~ that your opinion ••• differs from that 
of lJir. Adams that he is not apprehensive of laying you under aey 
embarrassments by requesting you to support the representations which 
23Ibid. 1 III, 809-16. 
24Ibid., III, 827. 
25Ibid. ~ III, 827. 
26Ibid •• III, 827. 
11 
his minister is ordered to make to Congress."27 To Adams, Vergennes wrote, 
"I think. all further discussion on this subject will be needless."28 
The fragile relations between Vergennes and Adams were not 
strengthened by Franklin's letter to Vergennes. Franklin assured 
Vergennes that the sentiments of Congress "and those of the Americans in 
general, with regard to the alliance ••• differ widely from those that seem 
to be expressed by Mr. Adams in his letter to your excellency."29 
At this point it is interesting to consider the footnote which 
Francis Wharton appended in his edition of the above letter of Franklin. 
It condemns Franklin for being over-severe: "Adams' letter to Vergennes 
of June 22, 1780, while it takes untenable ground as to the standard by 
which government debts are to be paid, only by implication shows 
unfriendly feeling to France."30 Franklin, however, in condemning 
Adams's views "with regard to the alliance" itself, put his fellow 
diplomat in a very bad light with the French court. 
Such a letter from Franklin was particularly inopportune for 
Ad~~s, because Vergennes, at this time, seems to have been influenced 
by some indiscreet remarks Adams had made to subordinate officials of 
the French foreign office. On June 17, 1780, Adams had taken a defiant 
stand on the touchy question of the Congressional monetary policy: 
27Ibid., III, 827. 
28Ibid., III, 828. 
291bid., III I 844. 
30Ibid., III, 844, n. 
The course Congress had taken was wise, 
indeed very wise, just very just; and 
those who complained of it were either 
English emissaries or spies.... The 
French had less reason for complaint 
than anybody else.31 
Again, on May 9, 1780, in assuring Genet that he thought the alliance 
solidly founded, Adams showed a surprising lack of deference to the 
French will. 
To suppose that France is sick of the 
part she has taken is to suppose her 
to be sick of that conduct which has 
procured her more respect and considera-
tion in Europe than any step she ever 
took.... It is to suppose her sick of 
that system which has broken off from 
her rival and natural enemy the most 
solid part of his strength; a strength 
that had become so terrible to France and 
would have been so fatal to her.32 
Such language of the undiplomatic Adams induced Vergennes to 
read more hostility to French interests into Adams's letter than it 
really contained. Consequently, the show of suspicion on the part of 
12 
Vergennes awakened real distrust in Adams in the French foreign office. 
Unfortunately, Adams did not stop writing his disturbing letters. 
On July 13, 1780 Adams discussed the naval efforts of France in 
the war, when he penned Vergennes "a few observations upon the present 
conjuncture of affairs. ".33 In order to cut off effectively the British 
line of supply, he urged that the French fleet be maintained throughout 
3ltoniol, op. cit., IV, 416, n. 
32vfuarton, ~· cit., III, 667. 
33Ibid., II~ 848-55. 
the winter at "Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware, or Chesapeake Bay."34 
Perhaps this was sound strategy, but if the United States decided that 
it was necessary to suggest to the French how they might more effec• 
tively use their fleet, it was the province of Franklin to do this. 
I'lforeover Adams incorporated into his letter some offensive animad-
versions. He was careful to quote an English propaganda squib which 
read: 
Let the whole system o£ F.rance be considered 
from the beginning down to the retreat from 
Savannah, and I think it is impossible to 
put any other construction upon it but this, 
viz., that it has always been the deliberate 
intention and object of France, for purposes 
of their own, to encourage the continuation 
of the war in America in hopes of exhausting 
the strength and resources of this country 
and of depressing the rising power of America.35 
And Adams comments upon thia idea as if there might be a foundation in 
fact for it: 
If these 'contrary opinions should be suffered 
to gain ground, as they most assuredly will 
if something is not done to prevent it, when 
all the world sees and declares as they do 
that it is the best policy o£ France, if she 
considered her own interest alone in the 
conduct of the war, to keep a superior naval 
force upon the coasts of the continent of 
North America, I leave your excellency to 
judge what a melancholy effect it will have 
upon our affairs.36 
Before Vergennes answered this letter of Adams, Adams deter-
mined to run a tilt at Vergennes from another quarter. He decided to 
13 
challe~e the letter Vergennes had sent him five months before regarding 
34Ibid., III, 848-55, 
3Bro"ra. 
concealment of the full nature of his mission. First he quoted 
vergennes's letter; then he appended eleven comments which he thought 
the subject required. He began his remarks 
I should have been ver,y happy if your 
excellency had hinted at the reasons 
which were in your mind, because after 
reflecting upon this subject as maturely 
as I can, I am not able to collect any 
reasons which appear to me sufficient 
for concealing the nature of my pow&rs in 
their full extent from the court of London. 
On the contrar.y, many arguments have occurred 
to me which seem to show it to be both the 
policy of the United States and my parti-
cular duty to communicate them.37 
Ten reasons follow. 
Then, while Vergennes had not yet received Adams's last 
letter, Vergennes wrote assuring Adams that "The Chevalier de Ternay 
and the Count de Rochambeau are sent with the express design which is 
the subject of your letter." As if in answer to the British squib, 
he added, "You will perceive, sir, by this detail, that the king is 
far from abandoning the cause of America and that His Majesty without 
having been solicited by Congress, has taken effectual measures to 
support the cause of America. "38 
In answer to this letter, on the very next day, Adams enthu-
siastically and spontaneously responded: "I assure Your Excellency that 
14 
scarcely any news I ever heard gave me more satisfaction. "3 9 But Adams's 
37Ibid., III, 861-3. 
3~Ibid., III, 870•1. 
39Ibid., III, 872. 
15 
response was such only because he had not given due attention to the letter. 
On July 25, 1780 Vergennes gave a complete answer to Adams's 
request relative to the publication of the nature of his mission. Feelings 
were not spared;tact was not used in exposing the position of the French 
ministry; the answer was vitriolic. Adams was informed that "to be soli-
citous about a treaty of commerce before peace is established is like being 
busy about furnishing a house before the foundation is laid.rr40 The result 
of the publication would but "give credit to the opinion ••• that the United 
States incline towards a defection."41 To propose what Adams did would be 
"to propose what was chimerical, and would be taking a step which it [the 
English ministry] would hold in derision.n42 Vergennes found it necessary 
to point out to Adams that "the English ministry would consider that com-
munication as ridiculous. "43 He found he had to warn Adams that "The 
English ministry would either return no answer, or if they did, it would 
be an insolent one. In case of the latter, why should a man needlessly 
expose himself to insult, and thereby make hL~self the laughing-stock of 
all the nations?"44 
In commenting on the eighth of the eleven arguments of Adams, 
Vergennes at last seems to find something to praise, but the praise only 
makes the rest of the letter the more bitter to Adams. Vergennes begins: 
"This is a sensible reflection. It proves that Mr. Adams is himself 
40Ibid., IV, 3-6. 
41Ibid. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
-
convinced that there are circumstances.whioh may induce him to conceal 
his powers."45 Finally Vergennes asks the self-respecting Adams to "do 
16 
the ministr,y of Madrid the justice to believe that they will have saga-
city. n46 All things considered., Vergennes treated Adams like an ignorant 
school-boy whose ignorance was causing him to make a fool of himself. 
Adams must have been chagrined by this letter., but he began 
his answer to Vergennes quite humbly; he promised to "suspend" any 
communication with the British ministr,y. But after a rather cryptic 
sentence., "Your e~cellency's arguments, or indeed your authority., will 
probably be sufficient to satis~ these people [congress] and to 
justi~ me.," he becomes more argumentative. He has just spoken of "the 
due deference" which will be shown to the sentiments of the ministry of 
France. Now he begins a direct refutation of Vergennes arguments by 
saying., "This deference., however., by no means extends so far as to agree 
in all cases to those sentiments without examination."47 
On July 27., 1780., the very next day., Adams "observed one 
expression" of Vergennes's other letter which he thought it his "duty to 
consider more particularly."48 Vergennes had said that His Majesty's 
action had not been solicited by Congress. Adams undertook to prove at 
length that such was not the case. Congress first made a request for 
45Ibid. 
46I'bi<r. 
4'7Ibid • ., IV., 7-10. 
48!bid., IV, 12-14. 
17 
this aid as early at 1776 and had repeated the request several times. 
This was too much for Vergennes. 
He no longer restrained his anger. On the 29th of July~ 1780, 
he wrote a stinging letter to Adams and severed relations between the two. 
'When I took upon myself to give you a mark 
of my confidence by informing you of the 
destination of Messrs. de Ternay and 
Rochambeau~ I did not expect the animad-
versions which you have thought it your 
duty to make.... To avoid any further 
discussions of that sort, I think it my 
duty to inform you that, Mr. Franklin being 
the sole person who has letters of credence 
to the king from the United States~ it is 
with him only that I ought and can treat of 
matters which concern them, and particularly 
of that which is the subject of your obser-
vations. 
Besides~ sir, I ought to observe to you 
that the passage in my letter which you 
thought it your duty to consider more par-
ticularly ••• had nothing further in vi&W 
than to convince you that the king did not 
stand in need of your solicitations to 
induce him to interest himself in the 
affairs of the United States.49 
A few days after receiving this letter Adams withdrew to 
Holland. Vergennes co~municated with Franklin and sent him copies of 
the correspondence which he had had with Adams. He requested Franklin 
to transmit them to Congress "that they may judge whether he is endowed~ 
as Congress no doubt desires~ with that conciliating spirit which is 
necessary for the important and delicate business with which he is . 
49Ib·d 
__:__., IV I 16-17. 
18 
entrusted • 50 
We shall conclude our account of the incident of the "teasing 
of Mr. Adams'' with Franklin's summation of it in his report to Congress: 
Mr. Adams has given offense to the court here 
by same sentiments and expressions contained 
in several of his letters written to the 
Count de Vergennes. I mention this with 
reluctance, though perhaps it would have been 
my duty to acquaint you with such a circum-
stance, even were it not required of ~e by 
the minister himself.... Mr. Adams did not 
show me his letters before he sent them •••• 
It is true that Mr. Adams's proper business 
is elsewhere •••• He thinks, as he tells me 
himself, that America has been too free in 
expressions of gratitude to France, for that 
she is more obliged to us than we to her, and 
that we should show spirit in our applications. 
I apprehend that he mistakes his ground •••• 
IJI. de Vergennes, who appears much offended, 
told me yesterday that he would enter into no 
further discussions with Mr. Adams, nor answer 
any more of his letters. He is gone to Holland 
to try, as he told me, whether something might 
not be done to render us less dependent on 
France.Sl 
50ro La Luzerne, August 7, 1780. Doniol, op. ~·· IV, 424, n. 
51Wharton, op. ~·, IV, 21-25. 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE INFLUENCE OF l'JATIONJJ.. A.lm RE~LIGIOUS PREJill)ICE 
In the previous chapter we have seen that Adams ensnarled 
himself in a troublesome and, to some extent at least, an unnecessary 
imbroglio. It is our purpose now to consider the causes of this 
diplomatic entanglement. 
It is impossible for us to view Adams's dispute with Vergennes 
as did his grandson, Charles Francis Adams. Charles Ada~s based his 
argument upon Vergennes 1 s instructions to Genet: "to assure ]'J[r. Adams 
that it would always give him pleasure to be supplied by him [AdamsJ 
with intelligence from good sources touching American affairs."l Charles 
Adams concluded that his grandfather merely supplied such information 
and followed normal diplomatic procedure. The rupture was due entirely 
to French duplicity, whetted by the unsympathetic utilitarianism of 
Franklin. Such an explanation falls before the simple fact that normal 
diplomatic procedure should have told Adams that both discretion and 
courtesy called for his holding himself strictly aloof from everything 
which did not concern the object of his mission. It should have told 
him that Franklin was the United States' i.1inister to France, while Adams 
lAdams, John, Works, 2.E,• cit., I, 314. 
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was accredited only to negotiate treaties of peace and commerce with 
England. 
But the explanation with which we wish to concern ourselves 
in this chapter differs ~ coelo from that of Charles Adams. It is 
that proposed by Henri Doniol, a prime authority regarding Franco-~~erican 
relations during the Revolution, of whom Edward Corwin wrote, "For an 
American student, with limited time at his disposal, to attempt an 
investigation of the Archives (of the French Department of Foreign 
Affairs) without a thorough acquaintance with Doniol to begin with, 
would be deliberately to incur the risk of one-sided and ill-considered, 
however, surprising, results."2 
Doniol places the blame for the diplomatic complication in the 
virulent anti-Gallic hatred of John Adams. Although no ~ professo treat-
mentis accorded the motives of John Adams, Doniol again and again 
expresses his conclusions about them as he describes the incident of our 
first chapter. First Adams concealed his true motives and bided his time. 
Then when an opportunity to do damage presented itwelf, he drew aside the 
veil.3 
2corwin, op. cit., 380. 
3Adams depuis-un mois en France quand La Fayette etait parti, donnait 
deja alors des motifs d'augurer que les antipathies et la passion anti-
gallicanes, representeee jusqu'ici par Arthur Lee a notre cour d'une 
fa~on dissimulee ou brouillonne, s'y montreraient desormais a nu et en 
quelque sorte systematiquement, sous le couvert official. Doniol, ~· 
~., IV, 409. 
Doniol maintains that Adams was a subtle intriguer and a good 
actor; that he affected ignorance in order to disturb,4 that he sent 
artful letters to entrap an unwa~ F~ench minister.5 But at other times 
Doniol claims that he was possessed of the insolence of an Eastern 
potentate.6 If Adams expressed attachment for the alliance, it was 
probably because an obliging minist~ had been beguiled into requesting 
such an affirmation just when it suited the plan of John Adams.7 At 
times, Doniol hints, that Adams was like a street urchin hurling stones 
at the unsuspecting passer-by;8 at other times he leapt to attack like 
one of Attila's Huns;9 but then, suddenly, he would reverse himself and 
become a ver.y Uriah Heep with the pedantry of his captious arguments.lO 
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4correct en apparence avec le gouvernement du roi les premiers jours, il 
n'avait pas moins parle de son mandat comme s'il agissait de traiter im-
mediatement avec l'Angleterre, et'c'est ainsi qu'il affectait dele 
comprendre en ecrivant au Congres en ce moment. Ibid., IV, 409. 
5Le sens et lea intentions de sa lettre etaient viSibrement etudies. Elle 
ne se bornait pas a dire, elle visait a faire entendre. Ibid., IV, 410. 
6Sans balancer, d'ailleurs, il s'autorisait de ses conversatiOns a Boston 
et de ses correspondances privees pour interpreter de cette mani~re le 
mandat que lui avait confie le Congr~s. C'etait done bien l'esprit de 
l'Est qu'il entendait apporter dans son ambassade. Ibid., IV, 410-11. 
7Avec l'air de se defendre que les Anglais pussent s'ad~esser a lui, il 
repondit le lendemain par de telles demonstrations d'attachement a 
l'alliance, qu'il avait probablement souhaite d'etre amene a les faire. 
Ibid., IV, 413. 
~e pierre jet~e, Adams n'attendit guere pour en lancer une autre •••• 
Ibid., IV, 420. 
9dette lettre a peine lue, le 27 ~uillet, il sautait sur sa plume •••• 
Ibid., IV, 421. 
l~~is la lettre du 25 le fit eolater, si l'on peut dire cela de quelqu'un 
se plaisant moins aux importements qu'A la pedanterie d'argumentations 
captieuses. Ibid., IV, 421. 
22 
At all times, le sectaire antigallicanll was ruled by anti-French hatred,l2 
and even when he departed for Amsterdam, he transported his politique 
antifranyaise.l3 
Now there can be little doubt that Doniol, when he was comment-
ing upon John Adams as Minister Plenipotentiary, surrendered his usual 
prudent judgment as an historian to the enticements of the rhetorician 
and loyal Frenchman. He surely went beyond the facts when he impugned 
Adams's patriotism by speaking of "le pr~tendu z~le de John Adams,"l4 
and when he commented upon Vergennes's refusal to recognize Adams until 
Gerard should return, by choosing a euphuistic adverb ·to express what was 
really an utter lack of diplomatic courtesy: "M. de Vergennes, le 15, 
repondai t obligeamment a J. Adams d I attendre le retour prochain de G~rard."l5 
Such .a position in so noted an historian perhaps explains why Edward Corwin 
said: "There are certain phases of the subject of French intervention in 
the War of Independence with which Doniol does not pretend to deal, while 
11~11. de Vergennes deolara sur l'heure la rupture, et il le fit dans des 
tennes qui ranettaient plus que s~chement a sa place le seotaire "anti-
gallican. 11 Ibid., IV, 422. 
12C'est apres ces-affirmations de la passion antifran9aise ou de la haine 
d'humiliation ressentie par lui ou par ses amis contre lea peuples dont 
ils n'avient pu et ne pouvaient encore faire autrement que d'appeler le 
seoours, que J. Adams avait donne a M. de Vergennes avis de 1 'adhesion 
du Massachusetts. Ibid., IV, 416. 
On n'~tait pas, ~ cela, debarrasse de cet envoy~ tenace. Econduit 
de ce cote, il chercha a revenir par d'autres •••• par oeux surtout qu'il 
supposait devoir causer le plus de g~e au gouvernement du roi. Ibid., 
IV, 419. -----
13Il avait transporte a Amsterdam sa politique antifran9ais •••• ~., IV, 
425. 
14Ibid., IV, 426. 
15Ibid., IV, 411. 
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on the phases with which he does deal he throws, for the most part, 
only the light shed by the French correspondence,"l6 and why Samuel 
Bemis said: "John Adams was a most resolute, unbending, and perti-
nacious American. As a diplomatist he deserves better of his country 
than many historians have been ready to admit."l7 
But despite Doniol's prejudice, his charge is a serious one, 
and it deserves careful consideration. Was Adams's political life 
dominated by hatred of the French? It might he argued that Ad~ms must 
necessarily have failed as a diplomat at the French court. It could be 
claimed that he necessarily must have regarded the French as a recent 
enemy, since he supported the British against the French in the Seven 
Years Tiar. As a democrat, he must have disliked monarchist France. As 
a bigot, he must have hated Catholic France. As a provincial, he must 
have feared the adroit French diplomacy. And the arguments are not all 
~priori. For in Adams's own Autobiography there are passages indicative 
of anti-French sentiment amounting almost to hatred. Our problem is: do 
they prove the active influence of national and religious prejudice in 
shaping the policy of John Adams? 
Unfortunately it is indisputable that like many fellow New 
16corwin, op. cit., 380. 
17Bemis, Samuer-F., The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, D. Appleton-
Century Compaey, New-York, 1935,17~ 
Englanders Adams was infected early in life with an unreasoning Galla-
phobia. To Adams the French in Canada were "faithless and turbulent" 
in civil life and priest-ridden in religion. While the French in the 
homeland were also dangerous in diplomac,y. 
On March 21, 1756, the twenty-six year old Adams records a 
Sunday night conversation on "the present situation of public affairs" 
held at the house of Reverend Antho~ Wibird. Judge Cranch of 
Braintree spoke of a letter of the Bishop of Quebec which had been used 
as a malicious squib against the ''turbulent Gallicks." This letter was 
supposed to show the "hostile spirit of the French Catholics." Adams 
reports Cranch as commenting upon this letter particularly about the 
French missionaries among the Indians. Adams concludes very briefly, 
"Some, he says, are very good men."l8 
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The tone of the last remark can be understood if we consider a 
note in Adams's diary for the previous month: 
The Church of Rome has made it an article 
of faith that no man can be saved out of 
their church, and all other religious 
sects approach to this dreadful opinion 
in proportion to their ignorance, and the 
influence of ignorant or wicked priests.l9 
On June 22, 1756, Adams comments upon the French and Indian Vfur 
then raging: 
The year opened with the projection of three 
expeditions, to prevent the further, and 
18Adams, Works, op. ~., II, 11. 
19Ibid., II, 5. 
remove the present~ depradations and 
encroachments of our turbulent French 
neighbors.... The British nation has 
been making very expensive and very 
formidable preparations to secure its 
territories against an invasion by the 
French~ and to humble the insolent 
tempers and aspiring projects of that 
ambitious and f.aithless nation.20 
On ,June 29~ 1766~ he mentions that two of his friends~ Goffe 
and Paxton "told stories about the virtue of some neutrals (the French 
AcadiansJ, their strict justice, their aversion to profaneness, etc." 
Adams brushes aside the whole incident with the sneer, "All this from 
25 
Goffe and Paxton was meant in favor of Roman Catholic religion and civil 
slavery, I doubt not."21 
When we apply the following principle of Adams's political 
creed to the question of his anti-French bigotry~22 we have added 
evidence to believe in its existence. Adams believed that "religion 
has been so universally associated with government that it is impossible 
to separate them."23 Now we know that Adams was prejudiced against the 
Catholic religion. Therefore, the argument would run, he is prejudiced 
against the French. 
20I bid., II, 23, 214. 
21Ibid., II~ 196. 
2~most vulnerable point of attack on the French alliance was the fact 
that the ally was Catholic." Van Tyne, The Loyalists of the American 
Revolution, Peter Smith~ New York City,-r929, 154. -----
23Adams, Works, op. cit., VI, 478. 
On January 23, 1761 Adams borrowed from a certain Mr. Gridley 
the second volume of the Corpus Juris Canonici, notis illustratum, 
Gregorii XIII Jussu editum. Before reading it he says that 11it will 
explain many things in ecclesiastical history, and open that system of 
fraud, bigotry, nonsense, impudence, and superstition, on which the 
papal usurpations are founded.n After reading, his judgment is: "This 
Institute is a curious monument of priestly ambition, avarice, and 
subtlety. 'Tis a system of sacerdotal guile. "24 
Although Adams prided himself that "narrow thoughts and 
bigoted principles did not govern his actions,"25 he could inform James 
Warren approvingly that in 1775 in his home town of Braintree that "we 
26 
have a few rascally Jacobites and Roman Catholics in this town, but th~ 
dare not show the.mselves."26 Even after extended acquaintance with 
Catholic France and Spain, the Church remains a "Platonic, Pythagoric, 
Hindoo monster;"27 and he doubts whether the superstitious South 
American Catholics are capable of forming a "confederation of free 
governments."28 On May 19, 1821 he asks Thomas Jefferson in a letter: 
"Can a free government possibly exist with the Roman Catholic religion?",29 
and two years later he notes that it would be unprecedented that a 
24Ibid., 
25Ibid., 
26Ibid., 
27Ibid., 
28Ibid., 
29Ibid. 
_, 
II, 116-7. 
x. 46. 
IX, 355. 
X, 100. 
X, 145. 
X, 398. 
"Roman Catholic monarchy of five-and-twenty millions of people, at 
once Cbe) converted into intelligent, free, and rational people."30 
This last is a direct attack upon the possibility of a French Republic. 
It is not necessary to mention his historical writings on 
Coligny and the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre to prove prejudice. Let 
a few of his remarks upon the Society of Jesus suffice; in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson on November 4, 1816, he says: 
My History of the Jesuits is in four volumes 
in twelves, under the title of "Histoire 
Generale de la Naissance et des progres de 
la Compagnie de Jesus, et l'Analyse de ses 
Constitutions et sea Privil~ges, printed at 
Amsterdam in 1761. The work is annonymous, 
because, as I suppose, the author was afraid, 
as all the monarchs of Europe were, at that 
time of Jesuitical assassination •••• 
This society has been a greater calamity 
to mankind than the French Revolution, or 
Napoleon's despotism or ideology. It has 
obstructed the progress of reformation and 
the improvement of the human mind in society 
much longer and more fatally.31 
27 
Three months before, Adams touched upon the restoration of the 
Society of Jesus: 
The restoration is indeed "a step 
toward darkness," cruelty, perfidy, 
despotism, death, and --- 1 I wish we 
were out of danger of bigotry and 
Jesuitism. May we be "a barrier against 
the return of ignorance and barbarism." 
What a colossus shall we be !32 
30Ibid., X, 408-9. 
3libid., X, 229 •. 
32Ibid., III, 225~6. 
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At times this record of ignorance, bigotry, and hatred is 
lightened. There was the time in the cathedral at Leon--Ad~ms often 
visited the churches to study the architecture and to learn the language 
from the sermons--when Adams was present for High Mass: 
The bishop, as he turned the corners of the 
church, spread out his hand to the people 
who all prostrated themselves on their knees 
as he passed. Our guide told us we must do 
the same; but I contented myself with a bow.33 
Then there is his rueful description of Versailles. After deploring the 
licentiousness of the French women, the dishonesty of court officials, 
and the hypocrisy of Voltaire and Richelieu, he admits there was 11a great 
deal of humanity ••• of charity and tenderness for the poor •••• Yes ••• There 
was a sort of morality." And then quite begrudgingly he adds, "There 
were maey other qualities that I could not distinguish from virtues."34 
We have now presented the strongest positive evidence for 
affirming that national and religious prejudices were the causes of 
Adams's trouble with Vergennes. Statements by Adams when he was presi-
dent, or which appear to be the result of his break with Vergennes are 
clearly post factum. In spite of this evidence and in spite of the very 
unusual conduct which Adams pursued in his relations with Vergennes, it 
is our conviction that we must search elsewhere for his true motives for 
acting as he did. We have seen that as an individual Adams was violently 
opposed to the Catholic Church. We have seen that, with the patriotic 
33Ibid., III, 248. 
34Ibid., III, 171. 
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exuberance of the young British colonist. Adams was unfair to the 
French during the Seven Years War. More than that can not be charged 
against Adams. 
First of all. anti-Catholicism did not influence his 
political opinions in opposing France. Adams himself handled this 
objection in a letter to M. Genet in which he answered four charges 
of the Englishman. General Conway. against the stability of the Franco-
American alliance: 
Religion is the fourth part of the barrier. 
But let it be considered. first. that there 
is not enough religion of any kind among 
the great in England to make the Americans 
very fond of them. Secondly. that what 
religion there is in England. is as far from 
being the religion of America as that of 
France. The hierarchy of England is quite 
as disagreeable to America as that of any 
other country •••• The Americans had. and 
have still. more reason to fear the intro-
duction of a religion that is disagreeable 
to them6 at least as far as bishops and 
hierarchy go. from a connection with England, 
than with any other nation of Europe. The 
alliance with France has no article respecting 
religion. France neither claims nor desires 
any authority or influence over America in 
this respect; ••• So that upon the whole. the 
alliance with France is in fact more natural, 
as far as religion is concerned, than the 
former connection with Great Britain or any 
other connection that can be for.med.35 
35Ibid •• VII, 173-4. 
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But John Adams was not such a religious bigot as his cousin# 
samuel. For# a;fter disclaiming belief in the doctrine of "the total 
and universal depravity of human nature,"36 he confessed that he was 
not a strict Calvinist. "I believe with Justin Martyr, that all good 
men are Christians, and I believe there have been, and are, good men 
in all nations sincere and conscientious."37 
Indeed, John Adams was a firm believer in religious tolerance 
as a political doctrine, but for him religious tolerance did not mean 
an insipid indifferentism in private life as it does for so many today. 
The man who said: "I am, therefore, of opinion that men ought (after 
they have examined with unbiased judgments every sound system of 
religion, and chosen one system on their own authority for themselves) 
to avow their opinions and defend them with boldness,"38 and who was 
proud that 11it is notorious enough that I have been a church-going 
animal for seventy•six years from the cradle"39 could also say, "My 
opinions, indeed, on religious subjects ought not to be of any conse-
quence to any but myself."40 John Adams could make the foregoing 
statements because he could distinguish between an individual who in 
debate boldly attacked the doctrines and practices of a church and a 
statesman who accorded the same church tolerant treatment. 
36Ibid., X, 254. 
37Ibid., X, 390. 
38Ibid., II, 8. 
39!bid., IX, 637. 
40Ibid., X, 389. 
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That John Adams as a statesman was not intolerant of the 
catholic Church can be proved both from his statements and from his 
public acts. He longed for the day "when all men of all religions 
consistent with morals and property, shall enjoy equal liberty, 
property, or rather security of property, and an equal chance for 
honors and power."41 He disliked the laws of Protestant Holland: 
The proviso of conforming to the laws of 
the count~, respecting the external show 
of public worship, I wished to have 
excluded; because I am an enemy to eve~ 
appearance of restraint in a matter so 
delicate and sacred as the liberty of 
conscience; but the laws here do not 
permit the Roman Catholics to have steeples 
to their churches, and these laws could not 
be altered.42 
When he drafted the Massachusetts Constitution, he was careful to 
include an article guaranteeing freedom of religion. 
He was even more opposed to the Episcopalian Church than he 
was to the Catholic. But there too, the objection was not so much to 
the Anglican Church, "but to the authority of parliament on which it 
must be founded."43 On December 29, 1765, he scornfully announced that 
"the Church people are, many of them, favorers of the Stamp Act at 
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present."44 He referred to Anglican ministers as "slaves in principle," 
41Ibid., 
42Ibid., 
4~b··· l.n., 
44Ibid., 
VIII, 232. 
VII, 648. 
X, 185. 
II, 168. 
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or "poisonous talkers" or "instilling wrong principles in church and 
5 ta te into the people, striving to divide and disunite them." And s orne 
conversed "with some of the seekers of appointments from the Crown--
some of the dozen, in the to~m of Boston, who ought, as Hancock says, 
to be beheaded."45 Because the Church of England was a creature of 
Parliament, with the king at its head, and its laws determined by 
British statesmen, Adams learned to hate it in political life, more than 
he did the Catholic Church. 
With the mention of the fact that Adams more often complained 
of the lack of religion in France rather than the presence of the 
Catholic religion there, we come to our second consideration, viz., was 
Adams a hater of the French people. Perhaps we may be driven to conclude 
that anti-Gallic hatred did not determine Adams's course as a statesman, 
that just as he was capable of tolerating the religion of the French, so 
he was capable of impartiality and fairness toward the French as 
nationals. 
As early as January 2, 1761, Adams, still a young and loyal 
British subject, was writing: 
If we consider every thing, the religion, 
government, freedom, navy, merchandise, 
army, manufactures, policy, arts, sciences, 
45Ibid., II, 169. 
numbers of inhabitants, and their virtues 1 
it seems to me that England falls short in 
more and more important particulars than it 
exceeds the kingdom of F'rance.46 
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In the course of the next twenty years there are many more passages in 
his writings showing that Adams was capable of appreciating French 
worth and that he was not dominated by anti-Gallic hatred. 
Just a year before the incident which Doniol explains by 
accusing Adams of anti-Gallicism, Adams was confiding to the privacy 
of his diary that even though the pleasure of returning home from his 
diplomatic mission in F'rance was very great, that "it is a mortifi-
cation to leave F'rance."47 In a letter to his wife, Abigail, our 
supposed Gallophobe explains himself more fully as he describes Paris: 
The weather is every day pleasant; soft, 
~ild air; some foggy days, and about ten 
of twelve days in January were cold and 
icy. But we have had scarce three inches 
o:i snow the whole winter. 'J'he climate is 
·nore favorable to my constitution than ours. 
':::'he cookery and manner of living here, which 
you know lwericans were taught b~r their 
former masters to dislike, is more agreeable 
to me than you can imagine. The manners of 
the people have an affectation in them that 
is verJ amiable. There is such a choice of 
elegant entertainlllent in the theatric way, 
of good company, and excellent books, that 
nothing would be wanting to me in this 
count!"IJ but my family and peace to my country 
46Ibid., II, 110. 
4'(-rb.d III 195 ~·~ , I e 
to make me one of the happiest of men. 
John Bull would growl and bellow at 
this description. Let him bellow if 
he will, for he is but a brute.48 
Since Adams's command of the French language was much better, he could 
now enjoy chance conversations with the common people of France. That 
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he liked th5m is indicated by his description of the female shopkeepers, 
who are "the most chatty in the world. They are very complaisant, talk 
a great deal, speak pretty good French, and are very entertaining.n49 
John Adams studied and admired French authors.50 lie appre-
ciated and defended French court and religious ceremonials.51 He was a 
student of French architecture, painting, and music.52 All of these 
facts are difficult to reconcile ~~th the charge that he was a mere 
"sectaire antigallican." 
However to consider the charge adequately, we must ask 
whether Ad~ns's statecraft and political activity was determined by his 
hatred of the French. Again the evidence see~s to show that it was not. 
In his letter to Genet in answer to G~neral Con•vay's attack 
upon the French alliance, Ad~a.s advanced the argument that "when two 
48Adams, Charles Francis, Familiar Letters of John Adams and His '~iife 
Abigail Adams, During the Revolution, Hur~and Houghton, 1Iew York City, 
1876, 358. 
49Adams, Aorks, op. cit., III, 196. 
50Ibid., III, 222:" 
51Ibid., III, 125. 
52Ibid., III, 118, 158. 
nations have the same interests in general, they are natural allies." 
He affirmed that between America and France "nature has raised no 
other barrier than the ocean," and concluded that a common enemy and 
an essential community of interest had brought it about that "America 
became the natural friend of France, and she the natural friend of the 
United States.u53 
Another argument Which seems quite persuasive against a 
charge of anti-Gallicism is founded upon Adams's perspicacity as a 
statesman. In 1775 John Adams was the outstanding leader in America 
who urged the colonists to contract treaties with Fra.nce.54 He urged 
these treaties, because he was well-informed of the needs of the 
United States. These needs were so great that Edward Corwin concluded 
that "the great majority of students today would, I suppose, concede 
that but for our alliance with France the War of Independence would 
have ended without independence."55 It was truly folly for a shrewd 
American statesman to be unalterably opposed to the French. 
One other reason for doubting that Adams was a "sectaire 
35 
anti-gallican," may be found in his ability to evaluate French motives. 
To many Americans of that day to bring in French aid was like the Trojans 
53Ibid., ¥II, 174-5. 
54Ibid., II, 487. 
55'CC5l'W1n, op. cit., 1. 
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dragging the wooden horse within their walls. Squibs were published in 
the Tory press which capitalized on their French antipathies: 
Say Yankees don't you feel compunction 
At your unnat'ral, rash conjunction? 
Can love for you in him take root, 
Who's Catholic, and absolute.56 
The French alliance now came forth, 
The Papists flocked in shoals, sir, 
Friseurs, Marquis, Valets of Birth 
And priests to save our souls, sir.57 
Even Washington admitted that he "never built much upon a French war."58 
But Adams in his mature life expressed none of this shallow anti-French 
prejudice, rather he gave an acute analysis of French motives which 
accords with that of our greatest modern authorities: 
Some gentlemen doubted of the sentiments 
of France, thought she would frown on us 
as rebels, and be afraid to countenance 
the example. I replied to these gentle-
men, that I apprehended they had not 
attended to the relative situation of 
France and England; that it was the un-
questionable interest of France that 
the British continental colonies should 
be independent. • •• But there was more 
than pride and jealousy in the case. 
56Royal Gazette, Mar. 17, 1779. Quoted from Davidson, P., Propaganda 
and the American Revolution, University of North Carolina Press, 
Durham, N. c., l941, 320. 
57Rivington's Gazette, Oct. 7, 1778. Quoted by Van Tyne, Loyalists, 
op. cit., 154. 
5~Nashington, George, Writings, John c. Fitzpatrick, editor, u. s. 
Govermnent Printing Of'tice, YV'ashington, 1936, IX, 22. 
Her rank~ her consideration in Europe, 
and even her safety and independence 
were at stake.59 
Adams insists that the French action was not a mere act of revenge 
against England; he does not indicate that he believed the French were 
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desirous of subjugating a part of the United States for their very own. 
He is capable of appraising their true needs and intentions.60 Such 
penetration is usually lacking in the prejudiced. 
So far from being prejudiced against the French during his 
years as a diplomat, Adams was thoroughly disgusted by anti-French 
bigotry. A certain "F" told Adams that half the gentlemen of Paris 
were atheists and said he wished he "could find one honest man among 
their merchants and tradesmen." Adams retorted: 
"Mr. F." says I~ "let me be so free 
to request of you~ when you arrive 
in America~ not to talk in this style. 
It will do a great deal of harm. 
These sentiments are not just; they 
are contracted prejudices; and Mr. Lee 
and Mr. Izard have hurt themselves and 
the public too by indulging in a 
similar language." F. 11 01 I am no 
hypocrite." Thus this prater goes on. 61 
Even after Adams's dispute with Vergennes which led him to 
insist that Vergennes is the only member of the French court "who ever 
59Adams~ Works, op. cit., II~ 504. 
60Ne are accepting tne-thesis of Corwin rather than that of Turner. 
61Adams~ Works, op. cit.~ III, 198-9. 
manifested any resentment that came to rolf knowledge,"62 he wrote thus 
to the head of the American state department. Secreta~ Livingston: 
Ingratitude is an odious vice. and ought 
to be held in detestation by eve~ American 
citizen.... We are under obligations of 
gratitude [to the French) for making the 
treaty with us at the time when they did, 
for those sums of money which they have men-
erously given us, and for those even which 
they have lent us, which I hope we shall 
punctually pay, and be thankful still for 
the loan, for the fleet and army they sent 
to America, and for all the important services 
the.y did •••• 
The French are, besides, a good-natured and 
humane nation, ver,y respectable in arts, 
letters, arms, commerce, and, therefore, 
motives of interest, honor. and convenience 
join themselves to those of friendship and 
gratitude, to induce us to wish for the 
continuance of their friendship and alliance.63 
From these facts, and because neither Franklin nor Vergennes 
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attributed Adams's conduct to his supposed anti-Gallicism. we are forced 
to look elsewhere for an explanation of Adams's actions. Doniol. it 
seems. too easily permitted himself to argue from the existence of anti-
Gallic feeling rampant in America to anti-Gallic prejudice as the 
explanation of Adams's unusual conduct while in France. Actually, 
Adams appears to have been following a more subtle counsel than mere 
prejudice. 
62Ibid., I, 652. 
63Ibid •• VIII. 94. 
CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL PREJUDICE 
The French historian and biographer, Bernard Fa,, has another 
explanation of the incident which was chronicled in the first chapter. 
Since he is an acknowledged authority in this period of histor,y, it is 
with some misgiving that we take issue with his view, but we feel 
compelled to do so in the interests of truth. 
F&y admits that the patriotism of Adams can not be challenged, 
and he makes no mention of anti-Gallic hatred. Rather, his explanation 
is founded on Adams's peculiar personality: 
Mr. Adams had the instinct of self. He 
conceived all his interests to be rights, 
which made him profoundly moral and ver,y 
powerful in discussion. Moreover, he was 
a la~er and imposed a logical and 
rigorous form on his egoism so that he 
could believe in his own justice. When-
ever he perceived the existence of some 
one else he was judicious and excellent, 
but ordinarily he was occupied only with 
himself.l 
With rather a generous measure of sarcasm, Fa~ develops his thesis: 
At first Adams had highly respected 
Mr. Franklin, whose conversation was so 
interesting, and who was a reflection of 
Mr. Adams's brilliancy in Congress. As 
such he was ver,y satisfactor,y. But when 
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Mr. Adams arrived in Paris in the spring 
of 1778 and had to be a mere reflection 
of Doctor Franklin, who ruled over the 
ministers, ladies, and the learned men, 
he immediately thought the situation was 
unhealthy. Nevertheless, his instinct 
of "justice" made him wait for some pro-
voking incident before he should give 
vent to his anger.2 
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F~y next explains how Adams united with Arthur Lee against Franklin and 
how "the two of them made life difficult for Franklin."3 
Now Vergennes was peculiarly friendly to Franklin, "as he 
• 
(Franklitij had been named minister on account of Vergennes' solicitation," 
and "in 1781, Franklin held onto his post only because he had some 
personal friends Who were clever at intrigues, and because he enjoyed the 
favor of the King of France. "4 Indeed, if he could Vergennes always dealt 
with Franklin alone of all the American commissioners. So in 1780, "when 
the hopes of peace had faded, the jealous New Englander gave some 
lessons in politics and morals to Vergennes to divert himself."5 
This explanation of Bernard Fag places jealousy of Franklin as 
the motive for Adams's attack upon Vergennes. Such a stand is supported 
by the fact that Adams's long letter of comment upon the Vergennes 
episode is mostly an attack not upon Vergennes, but upon Franklin. 
Adams finds Franklin guilty of "gross inconsistency in demanding or 
requesting the Count to recall his orders." He is surprised that Franklin 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., 442. 
4Ibid., 443. 
Sfbid., 443-4. 
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was ''so ignorant as not to see the iniquity of the French claim of 
silver dollar for paper dollar." He wonders whether the King thought 
"Dr. Franklin a hypocrite." Then he noted that there was a paragraph 
in Franklin 1 s letter "which is a downright falsehood." The sentence 
in Adams's letter Which sums up his understanding of Franklin's motives 
says: "I have always seen that it was Dr. :F'ranklin' s heart 1 s desire to 
avail himself of these means and this opportunity to strike r~Ir. Adams 
out of existence as a public minister, and get himself into his place."6 
Since this attack upon Franklin was written for the Boston 
Patriot thirty one years after the incident of Which it speaks, and 
twenty-one years after the death of Franklin, it is a good indication of 
the persistence of Adams's feelings against Franklin. There is also 
abundant evidence to indicate that Adams had developed his dislike of 
Franklin before the incident of our first chapter. Before considering 
this evidence, some indication should be given of the ebullient 
character of Adams's dislikes When they rose from affronted vanity. 
When Adams was but 'bwenty-three, he records in his diary that 
he was insulted in company by Robert Treat Paine, who was "conceited, 
and pretends to more knowledge and genius than he has." The conversation 
must have concerned Adams's studies in law, for he writes: 
He asked me what Dutch commentator I meant? 
I said 1 Vinnius. "Vinnius !" says he, (with 
6Adams, Works, ~· ~., I, 649-64. 
a flush of real envy, but pretended contempt,) 
"you cannot understand one page of Vinnius." 
He must know that human nature is disgusted 
with such incomplaisant behaviour; besides, 
he has no right to say that I do not under-
stand every word in Vinnius or even in ••• 
for he knows nothing of me. For the future 
let me act the part of the critical SP,Y upon 
him; not that of an open, unsuspicious friend.7 
He continues his account of Bob Paine's high-handed dealings with him 
by indignantly recalling that he had been told that once Paine in his 
absence called him ''a numbskull and a blunderbuss before all the 
superior judges."8 Just at the end of this none too impassive account, 
Adams 1 s better nature again asserts i t-.·elf and he concludes more justly 
that, although Paine "is an impudent, ill bred, conceited fellow", he 
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"has virtue, and piety, except his fretful, peevish, childish complaints 
against the disposition of things. This character is drawn with resent-
ment of his ungenerous treatment of me, and allowances must therefore be 
made."9 
Unfortunately, Adams made no request that allowances be made, 
when he penni tted himself to be "led on naturally by the Chevalier and 
xE. Marbois 11 in a discussion of Franklin, as he was returning to America 
after his first diplomatic mission in France in 1778. Adams had just 
hinted that Franklin did not go to church because he had no religion. 
Marbois's next remarks unleashed Adams's bias against Franklin: 
7Tb"d I 
.1. 1 • , I, 50. 
e-Ibid., II, 51 • 
• 
"No," said ~.1. Marbois; "Mr. Franklin adores 
only great Nature, which has interested a 
r 
great many people of both sexes in his favor." 
"Yes," said I, laughing, "all the atheists, 
deists, and libertines, as well as the 
philosophers and ladies, are in his train ,--
another Voltaire, and thence--"Yes," said M. 
:r;Iarbois, "he is celebrated as the great 
philosopher and the great legislator of 
America." "He is," said I, "a great philosopher, 
but as a legislator of America he has done very 
little. It is universally believed in France, 
England, and all Europe, that his electric wand 
has accomplished. all this revolution. But 
nothing is more groundless. He has done very 
little. It is believed that he made all the 
American constitutions and their confederation; 
but he made neither. He did not even make the 
constitution of Pennsylvania, bad as it is •••• nlO 
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When lv1arbois spoke of the wit and iroey of Franklin, Adams observed that 
"these were not the faculties of statesmen. 11 Later, Ada"!ls makes 
mention in a sneering way of "Mr. F's natural son, and natural son of a 
natural son." He concludes the interview by remarking that he thought 
it his "duty" in 11the interests" of his country to "do justice to his 
(Franklin's) merits." "It would be worse than folly to conceal my 
opinion of his great faults,"ll even from the influential French ambas-
sadors. 
When Adams had returned to Braintree, he wrote Thomas McKean 
his opinions of Franklin: 
He is not a sufficient statesman for all 
the business he is in. He knows too little 
lOibid., III, 220. 
l!Ibid., III, 221. 
of American affairs, of the politics of 
Europe, and takes too little pains to 
inform himself of either.... He is too 
old, too infirm, too indolent and dissi-
pated, to be sufficient for the discharge 
of all the important duties of ambassador, 
board of war, board of treasury, co~~isary 
of prisoners, etc., etc., etc.l2 
In judging whether Adams's evident dislike of Franklin deter-
mined his diplomatic dealings in France in 1780, it is necessary first 
of all to explain the diplomatic situation in France and the basic 
diversity of policy pursued by Franklin and Adams. We shall leave an 
extended treatment of the second of these considerations for our next 
chapter, since it is our opinion that in motives of state we have the 
ultimate explanation of why Adams antagonized Vergennes. 
The diplomatic situation and American diplomatic methods were 
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quite unusual in 1780. American diplomats labored under enormous diffi-
culties. They were bound by instructions which manifestly could not 
provide for every eventuality. If there appeared to be a need of modi-
fication on their instructions, the great distance to America made it 
impossible for them to refer to their government for advice and for new 
instructions. Hence they were forced to assume an attitude of uncompro-
mising firmness. 13 Indeed, every diplomat was accorded remarkable 
freedom of action. 
In addition, account must be taken of the ~overnment of the 
12Ibid., IX, 486. 
13Chinard, Gilbert, Honest John Adams, Little Brown and Compa.ny, Boston, 
1933, 141. 
United States which they were representing. As Adams put it, Congress 
was neither a legislative nor a representative assembly but rather an 
assembly of diplomats, i.e., of plenipotentiaries.l4 Congress was 
representing states who were very jealous of their sovereignty. The 
difficulty, then, of representing Congress, carrying on important and, 
therefore, sometimes secret negotiations was almost insuperable. 
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Finally, with a newly organized department of state, but 
without a trained diplomatic corps, and with no established diplomatic 
relations with the important countries of the world, the ambassadors of 
the former colonies of England were beset by enormous difficulties. 
Franklin's solution of those difficulties is expressed in a letter to 
Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777: "I have not yet changed the opinion I gave 
in Congress that a virgin state should preserve its virgin character and 
not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait in decent dignity for the 
best. I was overruled; perhaps for the best."l5 
The view which prevailed was that of John Adams. He had held 
that ministers should be sent to all of the great capitals of Europe, 
even though they had no assurance of being officially received. He termed 
this type of representation umili tia diplomacy," and after Franklin 1 s 
criticism of his dealings with Vergennes, he defended his diplomatic 
l4Doniol, op. cit., IV, 348, n. 
15Franklin:-Benjamin, Works, Jared Sparks editor, Hilliard, Gray and 
Company, Boston, 1840, VIII, 439. 
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conduct to the president of Congress by contrasting his course with that 
of "vei:erans of diplomatics." lie said that he approved of "the militia~" 
which "sometL~es gain victories over regular troops even by departing 
from the rules." He concluded with a sentence which placed his 
diplomatic procedure in sharp contrast with that of Franklin: "I have 
long since learned that a man may give offense to a court to which he 
is sent and yet succeed. 1116 On the other hand, as Claude Van Tyne says, 
Franklin's whole diplomatic policy in France was simple--"It is my 
intention, while I stay here, to procure what advantage I can for our 
country by endeavoring to please the court."l7 
There was bound to be disagreement between these two men. 
However Bernard Fa!f's thesis goes beyond mere difference of policy and 
maintains that jealousy of Franklin determined Adams's course of action 
in 1780. In spite of the considerable evidence showing Adams's dislike 
of Franklin, and in spite of the fact that Adams's unjust suspicions of 
Franklin undoubtedly made both Adams and Franklin less effective in 
France, it does not seem that dislike of Franklin determined Adams 
actions. Rather, the dislike itself sprang in part from another and 
more important source: essential divergence of policy. 
Gilbert Chinard explicitly contradicts the thesis of Fa!} a 11!he 
l~Vharton, op. cit., V, 196-7. 
17van Tyne,-claude, The American Revolution, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
New York City, 190s;-220. 
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so-called hostility of Adams towards the French Court was not grounded 
on petty jealousy of the 'veneration' in which Franklin was held, nor 
on any personal resentment. ttlS Carl Van Dorenl9 implicitly rejects 
Fag's thesis by commenting at length on the relations between Adams and 
Franklin without ever hinting at Fag's explanation. 
Fag's thesis must be rejected because it contradicts the 
opinions of reputable authorities; moreover it appea~s to be forced, 
since it does not explain why an honest and shrewd statesman like Adams 
should choose Vergennes as the man to attack; and finally, because of 
the truly amazing inferences by which Fag arrived at his conclusions. 
!<'ay attacks Adams in this way: "Franklin and Lee did not get 
along together, and Adams judged Franklin to be in the wrong, right 
away. 11 20 Now such a conclusion so unfavorable to Adams is not at all 
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evident. We know What disgraceful contention born of factions had split 
the American commissioners before the arrival of Adams. Despite this 
situation, we have no reason for believing that Adams took sides right 
away with anyone: 
It is with much grief and concern that I 
have learned, from my first landing in 
France, the disputes between the Americans 
in this kingdom; the animosities between 
Mr. Deane and Mr. Lee; between Dr. F'ranklin 
and llr. Lee; between lv1r. Izard and Dr. 
Franklin; between Dr. Bancroft and 1,fr. Lee; 
between Mr. Cannichael and all. It is a rope 
18chinard, op. cit., 121. 
lSVan Doren:-op:-Qit. 
20.B'ag, op. cit., 441. 
of sand. I am at present wholly untainted 
with these prejudices, and will endeavor 
to keep myself so. Parties and divisions 
among the Americans here must have disagree-
able1 if not pernicious, effects •••• I am : 
sorr,y for these things, but it is no part 
of my business to quarrel with anybody with-
out cause; it is no part of my duty to differ 
with one party or another, or to give 
offense to anybody; but I must do my duty to 
the public, let it give offense to whom it 
will.21 
Six months later, just before Adams left for America, he had 
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not yet taken a stand with any party and he sums up the situe.tion sadly--
"There is no man here that I dare trust at present. They are all too 
much heated with passions and p~ejudices and party disputes."22 He does 
not seem to have sided with Lee, for he says, "However difficult his 
temper might be, in my opinion he was an honest man, and had the utmost 
fidelity towards the United States, (but) he has confidence in nobody; 
he believes all men selfish, and no man honest or sincere.n23 If Adams 
attacked Franklin by saying that "his age and real character render it 
impossible to search every thing to the bottom," of Lee he added: "Lee, 
with his privy council, is evermore contriving: the results of their 
contrivance render many measures more difficult."24 
21 Adams, Works, ~· cit., III, 138. 
22Ibid., III, 188-9. 
23Ibid., III, 187-8. 
24Ibid., III, 189. 
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Confronted by these facts, it seems that Van Doren's conclusion 
is a much better su.TDm.ary than Fa9" 's: "Franklin at once and Arthur Lee a 
little later told Ada~s of the bad blood in the embassy. He seems to 
have tried to avoid being a partisan of either side, and to devote 
himself to straightening out the confused accounts and disorderly methods 
of official business into which the envoys had fallen."25 
As his next point Fa!} says: "Franklin did not pay for his 
pleasant house'but did pay for his suitable retinue of servants. This 
was all wrong. He should have paid for the house, since it was 
humiliating for an ambassador to be lodged for nothing, but he did not 
need a coach or so many servants, as the United States was a poor 
country."26 
This irony seems to miss its mark. \lh.en Adams arrived in 
France, the financial condition of the commission was appalling. Each 
corrunissioner had a different commercial agent, who drew upon whatever 
sums were at hand for his personal expenses. No accounts were kept, 
no duplicate bills were made, no distinctions were rnade between personal 
and public expenses. For example, Franklin had established himself in 
the Hotel Valentinois, without inquiring about the rent. Since this was 
to be the headquarters of the commissioners, Adams, who had charge of 
accounts, wrote Le Ray de Chaumont to discover "what rent we ought to pay 
25van Doren, op. cit., 599. 
26FaY', op. cit., 441. 
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you for this house and furniture, both for the time past and to come." 27 
As Chinard remarks, "Adams was pleasantly surprised and somewhat 
suspicious when the French financier answeredn 28 that he had "conse-
crated" his house to Franklin and that to have his house "inunortalized 
by receiving into it Dr. Franklin and his associates" was reward enough.29 
Adams merely thought that it was improper for the American commissioners 
to accept this house as a gift from Chaumont who had bid for a number of 
American contracts. 
Next Fa~ presents quite an amusing picture of the two men: 
Franklin worked night and day, sometimes sleeping 
only two or three hours, and was more interested 
in the output of his work than in sticking to 
formalities. Adams started to put Franklin's 
portfolios into such order that the Patriarch 
could no longer find anything he wanted.30 
Little need be said of this summation of the two men except that it is 
monstrously unjust. Adams did a great service to the American 
commissioners by putting their accounts in order, and with the exception 
of Fa~, most scholars a~~it that Adams's organizing ability nicely 
complemented the bonhomie of the Doctor. A glance at Franklin's social 
calendar makes the expression "worked night and day" appear pa.rticula.rly 
ill-chosen. 
One final charge FaY. makes against Adams which should be 
mentioned in passing. Fa~ mentions the fact that Adams wrote to his 
27Adams, 'ilorks, op. cit., VII, 31. 
28Chinard, op. cit.,-rls. 29• .,. - --Adams, liorks, op. cit., VII, 32, 33. 
30 --Fa , op. cit. 442. 
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cousin Sam and urged that the plurality of commissioners in F'rance be 
reduced to one. Fa"!J adds, ''His own choice was so evident that he did not 
take the trouble to state it.n31 Here too there is injustice done to 
Adams. Arthur Lee had urged his own a_ppointment as the single com.;nis-
sioner. Ad~ns did not. Indeed when Adams made the reconmendation that 
there''be a single commissioner appointed, 11 he expected either to be 
recalleu or to "be sent to some other capital."32 ".'JhenAdams heard of the 
appointment of Franklin as single conunissioner, he wrote in his diary: 
But this day Dr. Winship arrived here 
from Brest, and soon afterwards the 
aide-de-camp du Marquis de Lafayette, 
with despatches from Congress, by which 
it appears that Dr. Franklin is sole 
plenipotentiary, and of consequence that 
I am displaced: The greatest relief to 
my mind that I have ever found since the 
appearance of the address. Now business 
can be done by Dr. Franklin alone; before 
it seemed as if nothing could be done.33 
In conclusion, it seems necessary to censure Adams for his 
undiplomatic and uncharitable remarks against Franklin to the French 
ambassadors, and to condemn his injustice in commenting so unfairly 
upon Franklin's actions during the Vergennes episode. But just as 
this last item does not show virulent hatred, since the publication of 
a number of Franklin's letters moved Adams, who was then a vain old man, 
31Fa~, op. cit., 442. 
32Chinard, ~P· cit., 124. 
33Adams, IIT; 19!; 
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to defend himself, so it seems that the thesis of Bernard Fag must be 
rejected. Imprudent speech and ebullient vanity scarcely prove jealousy 
of Franklin was the ultimate reason which determined John Adams to 
antagonize Vergennes. 
CHAPl'ER IV 
THE IUFLUEi~CE OF MOTIVES OF STATE 
For a correct understanding of the foreign policy of John 
Adams in 1780, it has seemed necessa~ to outlaw the twin vices of 
national and individual prejudice as determinants of his actions. Uow, 
even if it were admitted that the hasty temperament and diplomatic 
inexperience which characterized Adams were augmented by another some-
what irrational element, namely: his dread of French sagacity in nego-
tiation, it seems that the ultimate explanation of his seeming hostility 
to Vergennes would not yet have been advanced. Fear of the "superior 
dexterity of the French plenipotentiariesttl would explain why Adams was 
never wholly at ease at the French court, but it does not explain the 
motive force behind Adams's course of action. 
The ultimate reason which moved Adams to act as he did seems 
to have been that he accepted certain principles to be found in 
Washington's Farewell Address, long before they were so enunciated: 
The great rule of conduct for us, in 
regard to foreign nations, is, in 
extending our commercial relations, to 
have with them as little political con-
nection as possible. So far as we have 
already formed engagements, let them be 
fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here 
let us stop. 
Europe has a set of primary interests, 
lAdams, "1"/orks, ~· 2.!,!•, II, 110. 
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which to us have none, or a ver,y remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in 
frequent controversies, the causes of 
which are essentially foreign to our 
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be 
unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by 
artificial ties, in the ordinar,y vicis-
situdes of her politics, of the ordina~J 
combinations and collisions of her 
friendships or enmities.2 
There is abundant evidence to show that early in his career 
as a statesman Adams wholeheartedly accepted the above view. For 
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e~~ple, speaking of the French alliance, Adams added these comments to 
his Autobiography for the year 1775& 
That our negotiations with France ought, 
however, to be conducted with great 
caution, and with all the foresight we 
could possibly obtain; that we ought not 
to enter into any alliance with her, 
which should entangle us in any future 
wars in Europe.... If we united with 
either nation [France or England], in 
any future war, we must become too subor-
dinate and dependent on that nation, and 
should be involved in all European wars, 
as we had hitherto; that foreign powers 
would find means to corrupt our people, to 
influence our councils, and, in fine we 
should be little better than puppets, danced 
on the wires of the cabinets of Europe. ·ive 
should be the sport of European intrigues 
and politics.3 
Now, When we recall that eefore 1776, the English colonists in 
America had become involved in every war in which the mother country was 
tA Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Bureau of 
National Litera-ture, I"nc., New-rork City,--mrhe F'arewell Address, 11 1897, 
I, 214. 
3Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 505. 
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engaged, whether or no they understood or cared about the issues 
involved, Adams's words seem to be an acute and cogent statement of 
fact. However, because the above account labors under the drawback 
of having been written many years after 1775, it may be argued that 
perhaps Adams inserted inadvertently some ~ post facto views into his 
Autobiography. None the less, because of the constant reiteration of 
this sentiment in his letters and diar.y, as we shall show in this 
chapter, it is at least probable that he was giving an accurate account 
from memory of his sentiments in 1775. 
There is another probable argument for asserting that almost 
from his cradle as an American statesman Adams held that those European 
nations, who either openly or covertly attempted to influence the 
councils of the United States, should be resisted stoutly. It is the 
argument proposed by Samuel Bemis, and it is a particularly brilliant 
piece of historical inference. Bemis first takes note of a paragraph 
which appeared in Tom Paine's Common Sense, which was published in 
Philadelphia in January, 1776: 
••• any submi·ssion to, or dependence on 
Great Britain, tends directly to involve 
this Continent in European wars and 
quarrels.... As Europe is our market for 
trade, we ought to form no political 
connection with any part of it. 'Tis the 
true interest of America, to steer clear 
of European contentions, which she never 
can do,while by her dependence on Britain, 
she is made the makeweight in the scale of 
British politics.4 
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Now, Adams in his old age wrote in his Autobiography that Paine's 
treatment of independence "was clearly written," but contained only 
"a tolerable summary of the arguments which I had been repeating again 
and again in Congress for nine months."5 Bemis ad_mits that a thorough 
search of E. C. Burnett's Letters of Members of~ Continental Congress 
revealed no record of any statement of Adams which explicitly enunciated 
the principle in question before January 1776, but he concludes that it 
is "quite possible and likely that Adams independently developed a 
reasoning against involvement in European wars and politics, even before 
Paine."6 
There is, however, an abundance of direct and certain evidence 
that Adams accepted the principle of no "entangling alliances" by March 
1776. Just at this time Adams was intensely aware that once the 
colonies were independent they would be deprived of trade with England, 
and that without trade the colonies' hopes of independence would never 
be realized. Consequently, to supply that lack, Adams looked to France, 
the traditional enemy of England, and a country which possessed valuable 
commercial holdings in the West Indies. From the first, however, he 
conceived his problem to be not how to attract French aid, but how to 
avoid being swayed by French influence while America was receiving her 
assistance. On March 1, 1776, he stated his position quite clearly 
5Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 508-9. 
6Bemis, op. cit-:-;- l~fn. 
during a debate in the Constitutional Convention: 
Is any assistance attainable from France? 
V\'hat connection may we safely form with 
her? 1. No political connection. Submit 
to none of her authority; receive no 
governors or officers from her. 2. No 
military connection. Receive no troops 
from her. 3. Only a commercial connec-
tion; that is, make a treaty to receive 
her ships into our ports; let her engage 
to receive our ships into her ports; 
furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre, 
powder, duck, steel.7 
Adams at no time tended to minimize the need of a commercial 
treaty with France; indeed, although he was a great lov·er of inde-
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pendence and one of the outstanding jurists of America, he said that it 
was his conviction "that these three measures, independence, confe-
deration, and negotiations with foreign powers, particularly France, 
ought to go hand in hand, and be adopted together."B Nevertheless, when 
Patrick Henry on May 20, 1776 wrote in panic to Adams that it was neces-
sary to make alluring offers to France "to anticipate the enemy at the 
French court," because otherwise the "consequence is dreadful,"g Adams 
viewed the situation more calmly. He moved with caution, always with the 
hope that a commercial treaty would be sufficient to guarantee French aid. 
It was his constant policy to avoid any political union with France. 
Vfuen he was appointed to prepare a form of treaty to be 
7Ada.ms, 'N"orks, op. ~.,II, 488-9. 
8Ibid., II, 503:-
9Ibid., IV, 201. 
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proposed to foreign powers, Adams proved again that he must be classed 
with Richard Henry Lee, who reiterated in his letters that "American 
independence must be her own achievement,nlO and Arthur Lee who 
constantly urged upon Samuel Adams that "American liberty must be of 
American fabric."ll The drafting committee consisted of Dickinson, 
Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, Robert Morris, and John Adams. In 
September of 1776, it submitted its report in the shape of an elaborate 
draft of a treaty, which John Foster said was "mainly the work of John 
Adams."l2 In his Autobiography, Adams summarized his work: 
The committee appointed me ••• to draw up a 
plan and report •••• Vfuen it came before 
Congress, it occupied the attention of 
that body for several days. Nfany motions 
were made to insert in it articles of 
entangling alliance, of exclusive privi-
leges, and of warranties of possessions •••• 
It was chiefly left to me to defend my 
report, though I had some able assistance, 
and we did defend it with so much success 
that the treaty passed without one particle 
of alliance, exclusive privilege, or 
warranty.l3 
Even in his private letters we find Adams insisting upon the 
same principle. In a letter to James Warren on April 27, 1777, he 
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lOJiendrick, Burton J., The Lees of Virginia, Little, Brown, and Company, 
Boston, 1935, 232. 
llibid. 
12Foster, John, A Century of American Diplomacy, Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, Boston, 1901, 197 
13Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 516-7. 
wrote: 
I do not love to be entangled in the 
quarrels of Europe; I do not wish to 
be under obligations to any of them, 
and I am very unwilling they should rob 
us of the glory of vindicating our own 
liberties. 
It is a cowardly spirit in our 
countrymen, which makes them pant with 
so much longing expectation after a French 
war. I have very often been ashamed to 
hear so many whigs groaning and sighing 
with despondency, and whining out their 
fears that we must be subdued, unless 
France should step in. Are we to be 
beholden to France for our liberties?l4 
Although Congress's instructions did not permit Franklin and 
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Deane, the American commissioners at Paris, to offer France an alliance, 
when they heard of the preparation of Burgoyne's expedition, they 
resolved to disregard this limitation. On February 2, 1778, they 
promised that if France became involved in a war with England as a 
result of her treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, the 
latter would not make a separate peace. Their action was sanctioned, 
indeed joyfully approved, by Congress. 
At this very time John Adams was journeying to France to 
become America's third commissioner to that country. When he was 
informed of the treaty of alliance, he recognized America's need of an 
ally at this time and accepted the news with equanimity. After he 
14Ibid., IX, 462. 
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arrived in Paris and had studied the militar,v alliance at first hand, 
he wrote, "The longer I live in Europe, and the more I consider our 
affairs, the more important our alliance with France appears to me. 
It is a rock upon which we may safely build."l5 
However, Adams's acceptance of the alliance as a temporary 
military expedient did not mean that he had abandoned his conviction 
of the folly of entangling alliances. Indeed his belief that he 
should do all in his power to prevent permanent attachment of the 
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United States to France or to any other European country still persisted. 
His attitude at this time is substantially that of Washington who said: 
I am heartily disposed to entertain the 
most favorable sentiments of our new ally, 
and to cherish them in others to a 
reasonable degree. But it is a maxim 
founded on the universal experience of 
mankind that no nation is to be trusted 
farther than it is bound by its interest, 
and no prudent statesman or politicians 
will venture to depart from it.l6 
Adams's cautious attitude toward the French alliance is both 
understandable and to a considerable extent justifiable. He was the 
representative of people who were exposed to Tor,v propaganda which told 
them: "Nothing therefore seems clearer, in human affairs, than, that the 
revolted colonies, unaided by Great Britain, can never shake off the 
15wharton, op. cit., II, 676. 
16washingto'ii; ~'irrtings, ,££• ~·, XIII, 256. 
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yoke of France, and that dependence on that kingdom must ruin America."l7 
The New Englanders somehow always had misgivings when the Patriot pro-
paganda answered: 
Let Britain's I~onarch aim at lawless pow'r, 
And on our western world his vengeance show'r; ••• 
1Vhile you great Louis, with God-like mind, 
Persist in your resolve to save mankind.l8 
Adams knew that this war was to be long and costly for the French. He 
felt that France intended to exploit any possible gains she was able to 
make from the war. He feared that some of the commercial, territorial, 
or diplomatic gains of France might be at the expense of the former 
colonies of England. 
Despite the fact that there is no evidence to show that France 
had sinister intentions in regard to America in the war, Adams was not 
the only judicious statesman who mistrusted Vergennes. Besides several 
American diplomats, informed statesmen of both Spain and England thought 
that America would pay dearly for her alliance with France. Florida 
Blanca characterized Vergennes's notion that a "durable peace" would 
follow upon the abasement of England as "quixotic."19 'While, on the one 
hand British statesmen feared the outcome of the alliance for themselves; 
on the other, they revealed their suspicion of French motives toward 
17Royal Gazette, Dec. 5, 1778. Quoted by Davidson, op. cit., 320, fn. 
18Pa. Packet, Sept. 4, 1778. Quoted by Davidson, op:-cit., 377. 
19corwin, op. ~·· 106. 
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America. "The laws of self-preservation," they said, must direct 
Britain. "If the British colonies are to become an accession to France," 
then Britain must carry on such a campaign that "that accession Lbe] of 
as little avail as possible to her enemy."20 
It comes as no surprise, then, to find Adams, soon after his 
arrival in Europe, urging America not to count too much upon French aid. 
In a letter to Lovell on July 26, 1778, he writes: 
You may depend upon it, although your 
agents in Europe were to plead with the 
tongues of men and angels, although they 
had the talents and the experience of 
Mazarin or the integrity of d'Asset, 
your army in America will have more 
success than they.21 
Throughout his diary and letters we find the patriotic Adams placing 
his confidence in the power of American arms. He hated the thought of 
being "beholden to France." The violence of his feeling upon this 
point stirred him on one occasion at least to an exaggerated outburst 
of passion. He tells us on the twenty-ninth of April, 1778, Arthur Lee, 
Vergennes and he met the W~rshall Maillebois: 
Mutual bows were exchanged, as we passed, 
and Mr. Lee said to the Comte de Vergennes, 
"That is a great general, sir." "Ah !n said 
2~he Annual Register, ~~View of the History, Politics, and Literature, 
For the Year 1778, J. Dodsley, Pall Mall, London, 1779, ~. 
21Wharton, op. cit., II, 664-5. 
the Comte de Vergennes~ ''I wish he had 
the command with you 1" This escape was, 
in my mind~ a confirmation strong of the 
design at court~ of getting the whole 
command of America into their own hands •••• 
·My feelings, on this occasion~ were kept 
to myself~ but my reflection was~ "I will 
be buried in the ocean~ or in aD¥ other 
manner sacrificed, before I will voluntarily 
put on the chains of France, when I am 
strugglin~ to throw off those of Great 
Britain."G2 
During 1779, Adams made a journey to the United States~ and 
returned not as a mere commissioner to France, but as minister pleni-
potentiary for the peace. As we have seen the New Englanders were 
careful to have Adams appointed to this post~ since they had been 
unable to have the Newfoundland fishery rights included as a sine qua 
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~ of the peace. Adams was recognized as one who would never sacrifice 
American rights in an effort to win the regard of France. 
As an exponent of "militia diplomacy," Adams was inclined to 
follow a policy which accorded him considerable freedom of action in 
dealing with the French court. As minister plenipotentiary for the peace, 
he believed himself entitled to even greater freedom of action. And 
indeed~ when we consider the disgraceful state to which the Continental 
Congress had fallen at this time~ it is hard to condemn outright Adams's 
attitude. 
Further, from his numerous adverse criticisms of Franklin's 
22Adams, Works, ~· cit.~ III~ 146-7. 
diplomatic policy, we may conclude with Morse that Adams looked upon 
Franklin as "charmed and almost useless."23 With all of these facts 
before us, it seems necessary to conclude that Adams regarded his 
mission, in part at least, as affording him an opportunity of safe-
guarding America's independence of France. 
64 
Then came the incidents narrated in our first chapter. Adams, 
who had not visited Philadelphia on his return to the United States, had 
no presentiment of thetremendous influence and information which Gerard 
and La Luzerne enj~ed as regards the councils of the Continental 
Congress. It was a tremendous shock to a man who feared that France 
covertly might be obtaining an overweening influence over his country, 
to find Vergennes loathe to accept his account of his mission and 
confident that Gerard would have more complete and accurate knowledge of 
the mind of the Continental Congress. 
This initial shock was followed by bewilderment at Vergennes's 
reluctance to announce the purpose of his mission. Why not tell the 
British that he had come to contract commercial as well as peace 
treaties with them? One reason which would suggest itself to a man of 
Adams's bent of mind would be that perhaps Vergennes intended to confine 
American trade to France even after the expiration of the war for 
23Morse, John T ... John Adams, .American Statesmen Series, VI, Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1899, 163. 
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independence. Finally, Adams's stand on the monetar,y policy of the 
United States was an unforseen but natural result of his great desire 
to see America govern her own affairs, free from the shackles of 
European politics. 
Even after Adams's break with Vergennes, there is abundant 
evidence that Adams persevered in his conviction that America must keep 
her skirts clear of European commitments. He tells us that he want to 
Holland for the very purpose of rendering "us less dependent on France. ''24 
In his defense of this action Adams asked these rhetorical questions, 
"Was this a crime? Was dependence upon France an object of ambition to 
America? If dependence had been our object, we might have had enough 
of it without solicitation, under England. 11 25 
Vfuen Adams secured financial agreements with the Dutch, he 
noted in his diar,y that he considered this victor,y one of the greatest 
in his whole life. In his state of exultation, he wrote to Dana, "When 
I go to heaven, I shall look down over the battlements with pleasure 
upon the Stripes and Stars wantoning in the wind at the Hague."26 
Although the treaty with the Dutch was truly a great accomplishment--
Foster says that "next to the French Alliance, the most important event 
in the foreign relations of the Colonies was the negotiation of the 
treaty with Holland,"27--it is not too much to say that Adams was so proud 
24Wharton, ~· cit., IV, 21-5. 
25Adams, Wor£s, op. cit., I, 658. 
26wharton, op. cit.,-v; 732. 
27Foster, op. cit., 43. 
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of it because it made the sovereignty of the United States more secure. 
As we study Adams's words and deeds during the next few years~ 
we see with how much force the principle of no "entangling alliances" 
moved him. In Holland he not only won a certain amount of financial 
independence from France, but he would not even admit without quali-
fications that the United States was beholden to France for diplomatic 
assistance in Holland. When Livingston asked Adams whether he had 
aonsulted Due de la Vauguyon~ the French minister to Holland, to ask his 
advice, Adams replied that de la Vauguyon "has been under infinite 
obligations to the United States of America and her minister for the 
success he had in this country."28 Although Adams acknowledged that 
"our cause could not have succeeded here without the aid of France," 
he was quick to add: "The American cause and minister have done more to 
introduce a familiarity between the French ambassador and some leading 
men here than any other thing could; and if anybody denies it~ it must 
be owing to ignorance or ingratitude. 11 29 
When Adams returned to Paris to take part in the peace nego-
tiations 11wi th an olive branch in his mouth, in his heart, and in his 
head,"30 he had by no means forgotten his principles regarding American 
independence from Europe. On November 11, 1782, he told Whitefoord~ 
secretary to Mr. Oswald~ the English representative: 
28wharton, op. cit., V, 689. 
29Ibid. - --
30Adams~ Works, III, 290. 
For my own part~ I thought America had 
been long enough involved in the wars 
of Europe. She had been a foot-ball 
between contending nations from the 
beginning~ and it was easy to foresee 
that France and England both would 
endeavor to involve us in their future 
wars. I thought it our interest and 
duty to avoid as much as possible~ and 
to be completely independent, and have 
nothing to do~ but in commerce with 
either of them.31 
Just a few days later~ Adams did not hesitate to explain 
himself to Oswald in person: 
"You are afraid~ 11 says Mr. Oswald today~ 
"of being made the tools of the powers 
of Europe." "Indeed I am~" says I. 
"What powers?" said he. "All of them," 
says I. "It is obvious that all the 
powers of Europe will be continually 
manoeuvring with us, to work us into 
their real or imaginary balances of 
power. They will all wish to make of us 
a make-weight candle, when they are 
weighing out their pounds.... But I 
think it ought to be our rule not to 
meddle; and that of all the powers of 
Europe~ not to desire us, or, perhaps, 
even to permit us, to interfere, if they 
can help it.32 
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Study of Adams's staunch support of all American interests at 
the peace table, of his collaborating with Jay rather than Franklin, of 
the gathering of clouds of his distrust of Vergennes might well indicate 
31Ibid., III, 308. 
32Ibid., III, 316. 
68 
additional evidence to show how strongly the motive of fear of 
"entangling alliances" influenced Adams's actions as a diplomat. Vve 
prefer to conclude ~~th the follovrlng passionate outbreak of his diary, 
as he referred to the fact that the peace commissioners for the United 
States were under orders to do nothing 1rlthout the advice and consent 
of Vergennes: 
I have been injured, and my country 
has joined in the injury; it has basely 
prostituted its own honor by sacri-
ficing mine. But the sacrifice of me 
was not so servile and intolerable as 
putting us all under guardianship. 
Congress surrendered their own 
sovereignty into the hands of a ·French 
minister. Blush l blush 1 ye guilty 
records 1 blush and perish 1 It is glory 
to have broken such infamous orders. 
Infamous, I say, for so they vrlll be 
to all posterity. How can such a stain 
be washed out? Can we cast a veil over 
it and forget it?33 
It may well be admitted, with Morse, that Adams in his policy toward 
Vergennes in 1780 resembled "a ship blundering through a fot; ban.1c,"34 
but it can not be denied that the Goal of that ship vms to free 
America of entangling alliances. 
33.,-b · -' T "'"I 3,..9 
·" J.u. , ... .L 1 0 • 
341:1orse, ~· ~., 180. 
CHA?rER V 
EVALU.ATIG'J CF AJ)J.;, .s 1 S ACTION 
The decisive motive governing the foreign policy of John Adams 
in his dealine;s with Ve:re;ennes in 1780 seems to have been not prejudice 
but a determination to lessen America's dependence upon France. 
Eovoever, to pass judgment upon the means which John Adams chose to 
implement that aim, and consequently to evaluate the incident which 
resulted, it is necessa:rJ to consider both the personality of Adams and 
the particular circumstances of his diplomatic dealings with Vergennes. 
The contemporaries of John Adams have supplied historians with 
abundant material for understanding his character. One of the most 
famous pen-pictures of Adams is that drawn by Benjamin Franklin. In a 
letter to Livingston, head of the American state department and rather 
unfriendly toward Adams, Franklin wrote: "He (Adams] means well for his 
count~J, is always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and 
in some things absolutely out of his senses. 111 Although, upon reading 
the above opinion of himself, Ad~rrs reacted by writing a long attack 
upon Franklin and attempted to prove that wisdom guided all of his 
actions,2 still it seems that Franklin's opinion is quite fair • .flowever, 
it was obviously influenced by the Vergennes incident. 
lsmythe, Albert H., The Writing~ of Benjamin :F'ranklin, The Mac..millan 
Company, New York City, 1905-7, IX, 62. 
2Adams, Works, op. cit., I, 649-64. 
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Franklin mentions A.daras 's honesty and patriotism; he implies 
that Adams was endowed with moral integrity. We can not fail to mention 
that such a judgment is in sharp contrast with Adams's opinion of 
Franklin. In one of his wi t:'lering; sunnnaries of Franklin's character, 
Adams remarked, "I can have no Dependence on His '!1ord. I never know when 
he speaks the Truth, and when not."3 
Thomas Jefferson, another outstanding leader of knerican 
Revolutionai"'J history, adds his opinion of Adams: "He is vain, irritable, 
and a. bad calculator of the force and probable effects of the motives 
Which govern men. This is all the ill which can possibly be said of 
him. "4 Here too, we have what should be an unprejudiced view of Ada..rns. 
Although Jefferson was a frequent correspondent of Adams in later life, 
he had been his political enemy. Further, no discerning American during 
the mature life of the out-spoken and tactless Adams should have hoped to 
exchange mutual encomiums with him. 
In his diary as a young man, Adams repeatedly scored himself 
for yielding to vanity.5 Undoubtedly, this fault in later life made for 
intractability. Lindsay advisecl. William Lee that he should be successful 
in working with Adams, were he carefUl, "not to hurry Adams too much; to 
lead his ideas as softly as possible may be well, but if I am not 
3warren-Ada..~s, Letters, II, 74. 
4Jefferson, Memoirs (ed. 1829), 88. 
5Adams, 1'iorks, op. cit., II, 61;72. 
mistaken in his character, he will not be driven, and has too high 
opinion of himself to take up hastily the opinions of others."6 
Adams's colleague at Paris, the celebrated American diplomat 
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and jurist, John Jay, paid Adams's statesmanship a high compliment when 
he wrote to urge his appointment as United States's ambassador to the 
Court of Saint James: 
It cannot, in my op~n1on, be long before 
Congress will think it expedient to name 
a minister to the court of London. 
Perhaps my friends may wish to add my 
name to the number of candidates. If 
that should be the case, I request the 
favor of you to declare in the most 
explicit terms that I view the expec-
tations of Mr. Adams on that head as 
founded in equity and reason, and that 
I will not, by any means, stand in his 
wa.y. Were I in Congress I should vote 
for him. He deserves well of his 
country, and is very able to serve her. 
It seems to me but fair that the 
disagreeable conclusions, which may be 
drawn from the abrupt repeal of his 
former commission, should be obviated, 
by its being restored to him.7 
From the above quotations, we have grounds for passing judgment 
upon Adams's personality and character, and these quotations may be 
corroborated by the estimate of the various biographers of Adams. Both 
Foster and Morse insist that Adams's "temperament was not suited to 
diplomacy,"8 because lfhis heat, quickness, pugnacity, want of tact, and 
6Letters of William Lee, collected and edited by Worthington Ford, 
Brooklyn:-1891, II, 420. 
7Wharton, op. cit., VI, 457. 
8 - --Foster, 21:• cit., 96. 
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naive egotism could not have been compatible with permanent success in 
this calling. n9 Gilbert Chinard and Charles Francis Adams agree with 
Claude Van Tyne, who calls Adams "the stern Coriolanus of diplomacy,"lO 
in insisting that Adams was 11a man of fundamental honesty and real 
courage."ll Vernon Farrington stresses Adams's intellectual worth: 
"In spite of his dogmatisms and inconsistencies he remains the most 
notable political thinker--with the possible exception of John C. 
Calhoun--among .American statesmen."12 He concludes, "Though tactless 
and blundering in dealing with trimming politicians ••• his many 
sterling qualities merit a larger recognition than has been accorded 
them by a grudging posterity. 1113 In this last opinion Parrington is in 
substantial agreement with the judgment of Samuel Bemis, quoted in our 
second chapter. 
The evaluation of Adams's character leads directly into a 
discussion of his antagonism of Vergennes, which was the subject of our 
first chapter. We have seen that Adams was by nature a poor diplomat. 
However inculpably, Adams would naturally give offense to almost any 
court to which he was sent. Perhaps it was this fault in a man otherwise 
so great which led Chinard to say: "One cannot help regretting at times 
9i'Jiorse, 2£.• ~., 166. 
lOVan Tyne, The American Revolution, op. cit., 220. 
llChinard, op:-cit., iii. -- ---
12Parrington, Vernon, Main Currents in American Thought, Harcourt, Brace 
and Compaey, New York City, 1927, I; 320. 
13Ibid. 
73 
that Adams did not stay at home among the people of his blood and tongue. 
In Congress he would probably have played a much more useful role. His 
ardent patriotism might have spurred on a lagging and dispirited 
assembly of men pinning all their hopes on foreign help."l4 
But it is Adams in France whom we are to judge. First of all. 
looking to the debit side of the ledger which records his diplomatic 
transactions in 1780. Adams seems to have lacked sufficient reasons for 
his 11 teasing1115 of Vergennes. However laudable was his ambition to 
lessen the dependence of the United States upon France, some of the means 
he used to effect his aim were quite purposeless and merely irritating. 
Adams was needlessly careless of diplomatic form. On several occasions 
Vergennes had to suggest what common diplomatic courtesy should have 
told Adams.l6 Such conduct was inexcusable. 
Secondly, Adams's assumption of duties which were clearly 
Franklin's was not only high-handed and officious, but it prejudiced 
the success of the American embassy. Moreover, it introduced needless 
bad feeling among the ambassadors of the United States; it presented the 
embassy with problems which undoubtedly should never have risen. It is 
difficult to imagine a more undiplomatic move than to flaunt the 
14chinard, op. cit., 157. 
15vergennes-rn a letter to La Luzerne summarized Adams's attitude by 
saying that he had "une nouvelle preuve de la taquinerie de L·1. Adams." 
Doniol. op. cit., IV, 424. 
16Adams, 'v'iorks, op. cit., 124, 304. 
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questionable monetar,y policy of the United States before the eyes of 
Vergennes. Furthermore, Adams's remarks to the subordinate officials of 
the French foreign office may have been pregnant with truth, but if it 
were absolutely necessar,y that they be uttered they should have been 
addressed to other persons. Finally, it is especially difficult to 
find a sufficient reason for Ad~~s's letterl7 insisting that America 
had often requested French aid in the past. For this letter came just 
when Vergennes was assisting most generously the American fleet, and it 
could only prove that Vergennes was strangely misinformed or consciously 
misrepresenting the facts. Ad~~s left Vergennes no opportunity to make 
a gracious retreat. Such an introduction of the tactics of the lawyer 
or the debater into the diplomatic arena was imprudence of the highest 
order. 
On the credit side of the ledger, John Adams as a diplomat in 
1780 has the good intention which guided him. His assertion of American 
needs and American sovereignty nicely complimented Franklin's policy, 
which really would have been too pliant to the French will. As Foster 
says, "No man of his day had a clearer conception of the significance of 
American independence or of the great future reserved for his country 
and none of our foreign representatives was so earnest in impressing 
17Wharton, op. cit., IV, 12-14. 
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these ideas upon public men of Europe."l8 
Secondly, even if Adams did not always choose the best means 
to impress Vergennes or Franklin that in the past "America has been too 
free in expressions of gratitude to France, for that she is more 
obliged to us than we to her, and that we should show spirit in our 
applications, ttl9 still, in other matters, he manifested considerable 
tact and reserve. Henri Doniol notes that Adams was careful to 
realize that the two most delicate items in the future peace negotiations 
with Ent;land would be the Mississippi and the Newfoundland fisheries. 20 
But for over a year after his arrival in France, Adams said nothing 
about these most important questions. Vergennes, who had informed La 
Luzerne in 1780 that he was prepared to frustrate Adams's efforts 
regarding the fisheries,21 was never stirred into action by Adams. But 
when he met the British representatives in 1782, Adams gave such a 
spirited defense of America's rights to the fisheries that he won them 
for the United States: 
Gentlemen, is there or can there be a 
clearer right? In former treaties,--
that of Utrecht and that of Paris,--
France and England have claimed the 
right, and used the word. When God 
.Almighty made the banks of Uwwfoundland, 
i~~oster, op. cit., 96. 
vvfuarton,~.-ctt. I IV' 23. 
20Doniol, op. cit., IV, 426. 
21Ibid. - --
at three hundred leagues distance from the 
people of America~ and at six hundred leagues 
distance from those of France and England, 
did he not give as good a right to the former 
as to the latter? If Heaven in the creation 
gave a right, it is ours at least as much as 
yours. If occupation, and use, and possession 
give a right, we have it as clearly as you. 
If war, and blood, and treasure give a right, 
ours is as good as yours.22 
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Finally some mention should be made of the unusual difficulties 
under which Adams labored. ~e have already mentioned the difficulty of 
being a shirt-sleeve diplomat for the American Congress, but it may be 
well to permit Adams himself to particularize on the embarrassment of 
this situation: 
Ambassadors in Europe can send expresses 
to their courts and give and receive intel-
ligence in a few days with the utmost 
certainty. In such cases there is no room 
for mistake, misunderstanding, or surprise, 
but in our case it is very different. We 
are at an immense distance. Despatches are 
liable to foul play and vessels are subject 
to accidents. New scenes open, the time 
presses, various nations are in suspense, 
and necessity forces us to act. ·wnat can 
we do?23 
Besides this, Adams encountered the established policy of 
American docility, little short of subaervience, to the French court. 
But the one aggravating circ~~stance which excuses much of Adams's 
unusual conduct was Vergennes's attitude toward him. In telling Adams 
22Ad ·~r k . t III ams, ••or s, op. c1 ., , 
23vvnarton, op. cit., VI, 52. 
333-4. 
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to wait for Gerard. to keep the nature of his mission quiet. to accept 
resignedly French concern for Spain even over the United States, 
Vergennes was guilty of egregious psychological blundering. He badly 
misjudged Adams. Indeed, it is most. probable that, even prescinding 
from the individual concerned, wise diplomacy should condemn Vergennes 
for acting in so cavalier a fashion. 
Yie now come to our evaluation of the incident itself. Although 
there is truth in Gilbert Chinard's SQ~~ary of the importance of the 
incident. we think that he overlooks certain important aspects which were 
in a very immediate way effects of the incident. Professor Chinard says: 
So much importance has been attributed 
to the difficulties arising between John 
Adams and Vergennes in the S?ring of 1780, 
that no passing notice of them would 
suffice. In themselves, they were of 
little consequence, but they revealed the 
rift already existing in the alliance, a 
radical difference between two schools of 
diplomacy and two national psychologies.24 
Now, if Professor Chinard means that we should be wrong in stressing the 
individual prejudice of vanity of the principals of our drama to the 
exclusion of the more important motives of state, we are in complete 
agreement with him. As we have admitted, we consider some of the actions 
both of Vergennes and of John Adams to have been unworthy of them. ~bat 
24Chinard. 2,£• cit., 140. 
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we object to in Professor Chinard's summation is that he seems to ~~ly 
that although the incident may have importance as an indicator of 
conditions in the .American embassy, in itself it was of little conse-
quence. 
Edward Corwin and Samuel Bemis agree in explaining the change 
in attitude of France toward Spain after 1780 as due in part at least to 
the Vergennes-Adams controversy. Corwin says: 
But some time before this upshot of the 
matter, Vergen..YJ.es had come to the con-
clusion that the standing of the alliance 
with the American Congress, whose chosen 
representative Adams evidently was, was 
too delicate to be further jeopardized by 
France's appearing in the thankless role 
of champion for Spanish interests where 
these conflicted with interests of the 
United States. 25 
Bemis's opinion is substantially the same: 
Stimulated by the delegates from Virginia 
and other southern States, Congress, 
itself containing members who owned title 
to western lands,became increasingly 
conscious of the importance of the western 
boundary. Spain was already belligerent and 
there was not so much reason to compromise 
as otherwise there might have been. French 
advice on this point became irritating. 
Vergennes, already aroused by the brusque 
state~ents of John Adams, who had arrived in 
Paris early in 1780 as peace plenipotentiary 
and who suggested opening direct negotiations 
with Great Britain, thought it best to 
adopt a neutral attitude as between the 
conflicting interests of his two allies 
in the valley of the l','lississippi.26 
The second important effect which, in our opinion, the 
Vergennes-Adams controversy had upon the diplomatic dealings of the 
United States was that it was the background for the treaty with 
Holland. Our view is based upon the conviction that there is a causal 
connection between the following successive sentences in Franklin's 
report of the incident to Livingston: 
M. de Vergennes, who appears much offended, 
told me yesterday that he would enter 
into no further discussions with Mr. Adat11s, 
nor answer any more of his letters. He is 
gone to Holland to try, as he told me, 
whether something might not be done to 
render us less dependent on France. He 
says the ideas of this court and those of 
the people of America are so totally dif-
ferent, that it is impossible for any 
minister to please both.27 
The opinion that chagrin over Vergennes's note severing 
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relations with him induced Adams to go to Amsterdam, even though he was 
not commissioned to negotiate with the Dutch, is strengthened by Adams's 
letter commenting upon the incident. The dudgeon of Adams which resulted 
from his clash with Vergennes seems to have been sufficient to fan into 
flame his desire "to render us less dependent on France." Adams said: 
"Was France avaricious of a monopoly of our dependence? The Count de 
26Bemis, op. cit., 103-4. 
27, - --. Wharton, op. c~ t., IV, 23. 
Vergennes was, I believe; but I never suspected it of the King, or any 
other of his ministers or any other Frenchman, but the secretar~ of 
foreign affairs and perhaps a. few of his confidential dependents."28 
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Finally, we believe that the Vergennes-Adams controversy must 
be classed as one of the remote causes of Adams's collaboration i~th 
John Jay in negotiating the Peace of Paris. Because Adams had learned 
to distrust Vergennes, he was quite ready to unite with Jay in refusing 
to follow their instructions, which told them to keep Vergennes informed 
about the progress of the negotiations and to accept his advice in all 
important matters. 
It seems evident, then, that the incident narrated in our 
first chapter is historically important. Even though both John Adams 
and Vergennes permitted affronted vanity and temper to influence some 
of their actions, still the ultimate effect of those actions went far 
beyond a~thing which could have been foreseen at the time. 
Accordingly, in summarizing this incident, which played its 
part in lessening French partiality toward Spain in 1780, in effecting 
the important Dutch treaty, and finally in excluding the French from 
British-American negotiations in the Peace of Paris, we have found it 
necessar,y to stress the great difficulties under which Adams labored. 
28Ad ,., k "t I a.ms, >~or s, op. ~·· , 658. 
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He was far from his diplomatic headquarters; he had to deal with 
Vergennes, who assumed an attitude of arrogance, and he had to combat 
the too great pliancy of the American embassy. Furthermore we have 
admitted that his vanity, his brusquerie, his intolerance played an 
important, though infelicitous, part in directing his course of action. 
But, beyond all these influences we have stressed the existence of some 
key-motive which would give a plausible explanation of why Adams 
entangled himself, in so seemingly unnecessary a manner, in his quarrel 
with Vergennes. 
Only three explanations have appeared which seem plausible. 
The first two rely upon the powerful impetus of prejudice; the third 
stresses intellectual conviction. 
The first explanation lays emphasis on the play of national 
prejudice against the French as the ultimate reason for Adams's clash 
with Vergennes. This opinion is supported by some of Adams's anti-
French remarks, by the adequacy with which anti-Gallicism, if it 
actually is the ultimate explanation of the incident, does seem to solve 
the problem, and by the authority of the great French historian, Henri 
Doniol. We have found it necessary to reject this interpretation, 
because all of Adams's anti-French remarks either were made during the 
emotional stress of the Seven Year's War, when Adams was a British 
subject, or can be much better explained by his fear of "entangling 
alliances." Furthermore, from his numerous eulogies of French worth and 
from his obvious devotion to the French military alliance, it seems that 
Doniol could not have had access to the Works of Adams~ when he formulated 
his thesis. Finally~ we have been supported in our conclusion by the 
fact that no modern historian accepts Doniol's solution. 
The second explanation is that of Bernard Fa;V. He urges that 
Adams's conduct must have been motivated by individual prejudice: viz •• 
jealousy of Benjamin Franklin. Fa:V argues that Adams realized that 
Franklin had acquired a great reputation in Europe; that Vergennes 
preferred Franklin to any other American minister; and finally~ that 
the jealousy of Franklin induced Adams to adopt his haughty attitude 
toward Vergennes. We have rejected Fa;V's solution because it is 
explicitly denied by both Chinard and Van Doren; it is based on inferences 
which appear truly amazing; and finally. it seems quite forced as an 
explanation. It is truly inconceivable that Adams who was noted both 
for his shrewdness and his moral integrity should choose to attack 
Vergennes for no other reason than because he could not restrain his 
jealousy of Franklin. 
The explanation which we have adopted appears to be the only 
one which explains all the facts satisfactorily. It seems to us that 
Adams acted as he did because he was convinced that French influence 
over the councils of the United States must be lessened. The facts which 
have induced us to accept this solution are Adams's acceptance, even in 
his youth as a statesman, of the principles later expressed in -vJashington' s 
Farewell Address and the I.fonroe Doctrine; secondly, Adams's opposition to 
a political alliance with the French in 1776, precisely because he ~s 
afraid that dependence upon France would be its outcome; and finally, 
the truly amazing number of tunes Adams expresses this principle of no 
"entangling alliances" during the years 1778 and 1783. 
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Our final recapitulation is that Adams was appointed by New 
England representatives to the Continental Congress because they knew 
that he would never sacrifice American rights to please any foreign 
country; that he arrived in France only to contact a French minister 
who desired to restrain his actions; that a man of Adams's temperament 
could not meet such a situation with bonhomie, but would read into 
Vergennes's attitude a threat to American independence after the war. 
Then followed the series of misadvised letters between Vergennes and 
Adams. The whole incident seems to have arisen because a man, who was 
not a diplomat by nature but ~no was a sincere patriot, felt that 
France through her foreign minister was assuming an over-weening 
influence over his country. In such a situation, this man, John Adams, 
decided to 11 put teeth" into America's independence from all countries, 
including France. Unfortunately, his course of action weakened his 
reputation as a diplomat, but fortunately its outcome was felicitous 
to the interests of his country. 
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